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A WORLD WITHOUT INTERNET:  A NEW 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING A SUPERVISED 
RELEASE CONDITION THAT RESTRICTS 
COMPUTER AND INTERNET ACCESS 
Gabriel Gillett* 
 
This Note explores whether a condition of supervised release that 
restricts computer and Internet access violates the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions.  Although a circuit split has developed 
regarding the scope of a permissible restriction, as Courts of Appeals have 
been inundated with cases challenging the validity of these technology 
restrictions, no court has yet viewed these limits through the lens of the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.  This Note begins with a discussion 
of the First Amendment and the theory of unconstitutional conditions, 
tracing their respective developments in cases relating to prisoners, speech, 
and the Internet age.  Next, it synthesizes the oft-criticized idea of 
unconstitutional conditions into a new three-prong framework, judging the 
propriety of a condition based on the government’s coerciveness in making 
the offer, the purpose for pursuing the condition, and the condition’s effect 
on protected speech.  Then, this Note surveys cases where courts have ruled 
on the validity of a computer or Internet restriction, and recasts their 
reasoning to discuss whether such a condition may be constitutional, using 
the coercion-purpose-effect framework.  Finally, this Note concludes that a 
condition is constitutional where it is accepted knowingly and voluntarily, 
is intended to protect the public rather than regulate speech indirectly, and 
where computer-monitoring and Internet-filtering technology is maximized 
to minimize First Amendment infringement. 
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Paul R. Thielemann had the support of his family, a history of 
employment, and had never had run-ins with the law;1 Thielemann, 
however, was a predator who trafficked in child pornography.2  After 
America Online (AOL) detected transmissions of child pornography from 
Thielemann’s account, it reported the activity to the Delaware State Police.3  
On February 23, 2007, law enforcement executed a search warrant, based 
on AOL’s tip, and seized Thielemann’s computer.4  Stored on the computer, 
the officers found hundreds of pornographic images of children, explicit 
online conversations describing sexual encounters with minors, and 
transcripts of Thielemann encouraging others to exploit and victimize 
children.5  Thielemann was indicted on eighteen counts of child 
 
 1. United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 1109 (2010). 
 2. See id. at 268. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 268, 269 n.4. 
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pornography-related crimes, and pleaded guilty to one count of receiving 
child pornography.6  The trial court sentenced him to twenty years in prison 
followed by a ten-year term of supervised release, which included a 
condition preventing him from “own[ing] or operat[ing] a personal 
computer with Internet access in a home or at any other location, including 
employment, without prior written approval of the Probation Office.”7 
Thielemann appealed the computer condition, arguing it was unrelated to 
the offense and overly restrictive.8  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit disagreed, finding the condition “clearly and properly imposed . . . 
to deter future crimes via the [I]nternet and to protect children.”9  
Thielemann’s case became the fifth time in a decade that the Third Circuit 
had faced a similar challengethree times accepting the condition as 
constitutional, because it related to the crime and did not unnecessarily 
deprive the convict of liberty,10 and twice finding the condition 
unconstitutional, because it was unduly restrictive and an overbroad 
regulation of speech.11 
The Third Circuit’s experience is emblematic of the struggle of federal 
courts across the country to balance the need to protect the public from 
released sex offenders without unduly restricting the constitutional rights of 
convicts that are no longer incarcerated.12  As child pornography crimes on 
the Internet have become increasingly prevalent,13 more and more courts 
are ruling on the legality of a condition of supervised release that limits 
access to a computer or the Internet.  Every United States Court of Appeals, 
save the Federal Circuit, has dealt with the issue.14  On one hand, allowing 
 
 6. Id. at 26869. 
 7. See id. at 270 (alterations in original). 
 8. Opening Brief for Appellant Thielemann at 2931, Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265 (No. 
08-2335). 
 9. Thielemann, 575 F.3d at 278. 
 10. See id.; United States v. Harding, 57 F. App’x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2003); United States 
v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127–28 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 11. See United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 39192 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 12. See Recent Case, Criminal Law—Supervised Release—Third Circuit Approves 
Decade-Long Internet Ban for Sex Offender—United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265 
(3d Cir. 2009), 123 HARV. L. REV. 776, 779 (2010); see generally Krista L. Blaisdell, Note, 
Protecting the Playgrounds of the Twenty-First Century:  Analyzing Computer and Internet 
Restrictions for Internet Sex Offenders, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1155 (2009) (outlining circuit 
split on the issue). 
 13. Amir Efrati, Making Punishments Fit the Most Offensive Crimes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
23, 2008, at A14 (noting cases of child exploitation via computer have more than doubled in 
five years, to 2211 federal cases in 2008); The Steady Stream of Child Porn Sentencings, 
SENT’G L. & POL’Y (May 2, 2009, 12:13 PM), 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2009/05/the-steady-stream-of-
child-porn-sentencings.html (lamenting that “seemingly upstanding citizens” consume child 
pornography). 
 14. See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 85556 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 6974 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 
884, 89596 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 4346 (2d Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Granger, 117 F. App’x 247, 24849 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 62022 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280, 
128485 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 87779 (7th Cir. 2003); 
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a rehabilitating prisoner to use the Internet affords him15 the chance to 
communicate with millions of people and “access vast amounts of 
information from around the world.”16  Nevertheless, Internet access also 
provides the offender the means to seek new victims and the opportunity to 
prey on society’s weakest members.17 
While courts have frequently ruled on the propriety of limiting computer 
and Internet access as a condition of supervised release, they have not 
discussed the issue using the theory of unconstitutional conditions.18  This 
Note will harness the relevant cases and theories to develop a new 
framework to examine whether such a restriction may be an 
unconstitutional condition.  It will do so by looking at this legal question 
through the prism of cases that have not explicitly addressed 
unconstitutional conditions, despite the opportunity.  Part I.A introduces the 
U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment right to free speech and its adaptation 
in the technological age, which is crucial to understanding the backdrop of 
disputes over a restriction that limits access to technology.  Then, Part I.B 
recounts the history and theory of unconstitutional conditions, including the 
theory’s application in First Amendment and prisoner contexts.  Part I.C 
offers a new three-prong framework, gleaned from the reasoning of courts 
and commentators, to analyze the constitutionality of a condition that limits 
computer and Internet use.  These prongs judge whether the government 
coerces a beneficiary into accepting a conditional offer, whether the 
government’s purpose for a condition is proper, and whether a condition’s 
effect on speech is overly restrictive.  Finally, Part I.C explains why 
imposing a computer or Internet restriction as a condition of supervised 
release for a sex offender may create an unconstitutional conditions 
problem.  Part II surveys cases where courts have ruled on the validity of a 
computer condition, and recasts their reasoning to discuss whether or not 
such a condition may be constitutional, using this Note’s coercion-purpose-
 
United States v. Suggs, 50 F. App’x 208 (6th Cir. 2002) (imposing condition in fraud case); 
United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 98788 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Paul, 274 
F.3d 155, 16770 (5th Cir. 2001); supra notes 1012 (discussing Third Circuit cases); see 
also David Kravets, U.S. Courts Split on Internet Bans, WIRED THREAT LEVEL BLOG (Jan. 
12, 2010, 5:11 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/courts-split-on-internet-
bans/. 
 15. This Note uses third-person masculine pronouns because almost all defendants in 
child pornography cases are men. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
SPECIAL REPORT:  FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF CHILD SEX EXPLOITATION OFFENDERS, 2006, at 
5 (2007) (compiling statistics indicating that, in 2006, 98.7% of child pornography 
defendants were male). 
 16. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997). 
 17. See James Brooke, Sex Web Spun Worldwide Traps Children, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 
2001, at A12 (“[T]he Internet . . . explosion has been a boon to adults who prey on young 
people for sex . . . .”); Jerry Markon, Tracking Sex-Crime Offenders Gets Trickier, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 23, 2009, at A1. 
 18. See infra Part I.C.  See generally Doug Hyne, Examining the Legal Challenges to the 
Restriction of Computer Access as a Term of Probation or Supervised Release, 28 NEW ENG. 
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 215 (2002) (discussing sentencing for Internet crimes, but 
not mentioning unconstitutional conditions); Emily Brant, Comment, Sentencing “Cybersex 
Offenders”:  Individual Offenders Require Individualized Conditions When Courts Restrict 
Their Computer Use and Internet Access, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 779 (2009) (same). 
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effect framework.  Finally, Part III argues that a condition that limits 
computer and Internet access is constitutional where the convict is not 
compelled to accept release, the government does not intend to regulate 
speech indirectly, and the condition protects children while minimizing 
First Amendment infringement. 
I. UNDERSTANDING A TECHNOLOGY RESTRICTION ON SUPERVISED 
RELEASE:  THE FIRST AMENDMENT, PRISONERS, AND THE THEORY OF 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
Part I of this Note introduces the First Amendment and the elements 
needed to determine the validity of a condition on supervised release.  First, 
it lays out the right to freedom of speech as it relates to prisoners, 
pornography, and the Internet, because a computer and Internet restriction 
as a condition of supervised release operates at the nexus of these issues.  
Next, it describes the “doctrine” of unconstitutional conditions, including 
the theoretical foundation and case law related to a condition that 
circumscribes speech or prisoner rights.  Then, it synthesizes various 
frameworks for analyzing a condition to offer a new model for judging the 
validity of a condition.  Finally, this part explains why a restriction on 
computer and Internet access as a condition of supervised release may 
create an unconstitutional condition. 
A. The Scope and Limits of First Amendment Freedom of Speech 
The First Amendment is implicated because it underlies concerns about 
the effect of computer and Internet restrictions on the speech of convicts on 
supervised release.  The First Amendment prohibits the federal government 
from “abridging the freedom of speech.”19  The right to free speech was 
enshrined in the Constitution to “assure unfettered interchange of ideas for 
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”20  
It has since been credited as the foundation upon which American 
democracy thrives.21  Despite the broad guarantee of freedom of speech in 
the text of the First Amendment, the government is not affirmatively 
obligated to provide citizens the means to exercise those rights,22 and the 
 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The guarantee of freedom of speech originally only applied 
to the federal government, but has since been incorporated against the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 
(1925). 
 20. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
 21. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 38 (3d ed. 2008); THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH:  ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE 
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 1320 (Vikram David Amar ed., 2009); see also DAVID G. POST, IN 
SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE:  NOTES ON THE STATE OF CYBERSPACE 18792 (2009) 
(detailing Thomas Jefferson’s view on the critical importance of the First Amendment). 
 22. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (stating the right to free speech as a prohibition on 
government activity); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 
115 (1995) (“Government is under no obligation to subsidize speech. It can refuse to fund 
any and all speech-related activities. If it does not want to fund expression at all, it is free to 
do so.”); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions:  The Problem of Negative Rights in a 
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 132425 (1984). 
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U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held the government may stifle speech 
in appropriate situations.23  By way of example, this part discusses how the 
government may limit speech for prisoners at various stages of 
incarceration, and may also restrict obscene speech that the First 
Amendment does not protect.  If the government may regulate speech in the 
tangible world, it also may regulate similar speech occurring online. 
1. A Convict’s Enjoyment of First Amendment Speech Rights Depends on 
His Level of Incarceration 
The government’s power to regulate prisoner speech is commensurate 
with the level of incarceration along a continuum of severity of punishment, 
and is at its apogee for incarcerated prisoners.  In Procunier v. Martinez,24 
the Supreme Court established that the government need only show that a 
regulation reasonably relates to maintaining prison order to comply with the 
First Amendment.25  Procunier also empowered the government to impose 
a speech regulation within prison where it rationally advanced the state 
interest in security or rehabilitation, and did not limit speech more than 
necessary.26  This justified restrictions on speech between prisoners in 
different institutions and limits on an inmate’s right to access speech from 
outside prison where the government showed its actions related to prison 
safety and security.27  The Procunier line of cases has been adapted in 
modern times to substantiate regulations that curb Internet access inside 
prison,28 though electronic communication may have a positive impact on 
inmate rehabilitation and ease reintegration into society after a sentence is 
completed.29  Thus, the Court found that a prisoner in lockup has a more 
limited right to free speech than a person outside the prison walls. 
While the government may regulate speech for a prison inmate, it has 
much less power to restrict the First Amendment rights of a released 
convict on parole or probation.  Parole is a system where the government 
decides to release the prisoner before he serves the full sentence, often 
 
 23. See STONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 3 (comparing Justice Hugo Black’s absolutist 
view of the First Amendment, which rejects all speech limits, with Court precedent 
upholding restrictions). 
 24. 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 
 25. See id. at 41213; see also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 40814 (1989) 
(reviewing prison speech regulations under a reasonableness standard). 
 26. See Procunier, 416 U.S. at 41314. 
 27. See id.; see also Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 40304, 415; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 
78, 9194 (1987). 
 28. See Karen J. Hartman, Prison Walls and Firewalls:  H.B. 2376Arizona Denies 
Inmates Access to the Internet, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1423, 1430 (2000); Titia A. Holtz, Note, 
Reaching Out from Behind Bars:  The Constitutionality of Laws Barring Prisoners from the 
Internet, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 855, 86066 (2002) (scrutinizing regulations prohibiting inmate 
Internet access). 
 29. See, e.g., Michael James, Learning Behind Bars, BALT. SUN, Feb. 12, 2001, at C1.  
Internet access may also help a detained prisoner pursue his case in court. See Michael 
Rothfeld, Texas Prison is Technology Vortex, Allen Stanford Says, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG 
(Aug. 13, 2010, 4:21 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/08/13/texas-prison-is-technology-
vortex-allen-stanford-says/. 
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because of good behavior.30  It is typically given to a convict who is not yet 
ready for freedom, and often requires the parolee to report regularly to a 
parole officer.31  Even less severe is probation, a court-imposed sentence 
given in lieu of a prison term.32  In either case, the government maintains 
leverage to enforce the condition by retaining power to alter the condition 
or return the convict to prison.33  A released convict’s conditional liberty 
affords him greater speech rights than an inmate, but only to the extent that 
the state’s interest in public safety or prisoner rehabilitation is not 
implicated.34  For example, the government may restrict speech for 
penological reasons, but may not universally require a parolee to obtain 
permission before speaking publicly,35 or prevent a released convict from 
profiting by publishing details of a crime.36  In essence, the government 
must prove a more rational connection between limiting parolee or 
probationer speech and public safety to comport with the First Amendment. 
Supervised release is a hybrid penalty, which creates an intermediate 
burden for the state to justify burdens on convict speech.  Supervised 
release, “in contrast to probation [or parole], is ‘meted out in addition to, 
 
 30. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1227 (9th ed. 2009); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (stating parole is given to reintegrate prisoners into society while 
cutting incarceration costs). See generally JUDITH GREENE & MARC MAUER, THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT, DOWNSCALING PRISONS:  LESSONS FROM FOUR STATES (2010), 
available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
publications/inc_DownscalingPrisons2010.pdf (charting early release trends); ILYANA 
KUZIEMKO, GOING OFF PAROLE:  HOW THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRETIONARY PRISON RELEASE 
AFFECTS THE SOCIAL COST OF CRIME (2007), available at 
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/workshops/AppliedEcon/archive/pdf/Kuziemko-
GoingOffParole.pdf (suggesting that parole lowers long-term prison costs and reduces 
recidivism). 
 31. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 854 (2006).  Federal parole decisions are 
made by the U.S. Parole Commission, a Justice Department agency. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE:  
ANSWERING YOUR QUESTIONS, http://www.justice.gov/uspc/questions.htm (last visited Sept. 
23, 2010). 
 32. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1322 (9th ed. 2009); infra note 37 and accompanying 
text. 
 33. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 47880; see also LAUREN E. GLAZE & THOMAS P. 
BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULL. , PROBATION AND 
PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2008, at 1 (2009), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus08.pdf (counting, as of 2007, more than five 
million probationers and parolees in the United States); Solomon Moore, Struggling to Keep 
Tabs on Paroled Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2009, at A14 (highlighting parole’s 
impact on state prison systems). 
 34. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (“[I]t is always true of 
probationers . . . that they do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, 
but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] 
restrictions.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480)); Morrissey, 408 
U.S. at 482; United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 & n.14 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(noting a condition on probationer and parolee speech is not per se suspect). 
 35. See United States v. Richards, No. 09-10324, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13133, at *67 
(9th Cir. June 25, 2010); Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 334 (10th Cir. 1971); Hyland v. 
Procunier, 311 F. Supp. 749, 75051 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
 36. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 10815, 12023 (1991). 
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not in lieu of, incarceration.’”37  This places it in the middle of the 
continuum because it is more lenient than jail time, but more harsh than 
parole or probation.38  The United States Probation Office, an arm of the 
judicial branch, oversees a convict on supervised release.39  To deter 
recidivism, a court has independent power to impose conditions of release, 
alter the conditions after confinement, and hold a convict in contempt for 
any violation.40  Following the logic of Procunier and its progeny, the 
government has less power to restrict the liberty and speech of a convict on 
supervised release precisely because it is a less harsh punishment than 
prison.41  However, the government may restrict the speech of a convict on 
supervised release where it has a legitimate state interest. 
2. The Government’s Power To Limit Enjoyment of Sexually Explicit 
Material Depends on the Type of Content 
Just as the government’s authority to constrain prisoner speech differs 
based on the severity of the punishment, its power to regulate non-prisoner 
speech also varies based on the nature of the content.  Despite the Supreme 
Court’s holding that states could regulate sexually explicit speech for 
minors,42 the line between pornography and obscenity as it related to adults 
remained unclear until Miller v. California.43  In that case, a jury convicted 
the owner of a mail-order business, which sold erotic photos and drawings, 
of a misdemeanor after he sent unsolicited advertising brochures to 
potential customers.44  In a landmark ruling, the Supreme Court held that 
“obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment.”45  However, 
due to the danger of speech regulation, it found that obscenity was 
“carefully limited” to sexual content that met the following standard:46 
 
 37. United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 461 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. 
Cardona, 903 F.2d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
 38. United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 181 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Reyes, 283 
F.3d at 461)). 
 39. See Reyes, 283 F.3d at 455 (recounting the history, structure, and purpose of 
supervised release); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 36023603 (2006) (describing appointment and 
duties of probation officers).  The judicial branch oversees parolee supervision. U.S. 
COURTS, THE SYSTEM AND ITS OFFICERS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/ProbationPretrialServices/Supervision.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2010). 
 40. See United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582, 588 (6th Cir. 1995); see also 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(d) (listing criteria for imposition of supervised release); Gozlon-Peretz v. United 
States, 498 U.S. 395, 40708 (1991) (discussing the history of supervised release). 
 41. See supra notes 2427, 3436 and accompanying text; cf. Reyes, 283 F.3d at 462 
(clarifying, in search context, the validity of curbing constitutional rights based on 
continuum of punishment). 
 42. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 63133 (1968). 
 43. 413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973) (re-examining precedent on “the intractable obscenity 
problem” (quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) 
(Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting))). 
 44. Id. at 1618. 
 45. Id. at 36. 
 46. Id. at 2324. 
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(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards” would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the 
prurient interest; . . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the 
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.47 
While Miller established that the government may have the power to 
regulate obscene material within the strictures of the First Amendment, it 
failed to provide guidance on whether obscene content was the only 
regulable speech under the First Amendment. 
Nine years after Miller, the Supreme Court found that the government 
may regulate child pornography, whether deemed obscene or not.  In New 
York v. Ferber,48 a jury convicted a bookstore owner of violating a law that 
outlawed sales of material depicting sexual conduct by minors.49  The New 
York Court of Appeals struck down the law, saying its failure to include a 
standard for obscenity violated free speech.50  The Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari to decide if child pornography must be regulated as 
obscenity,51 found it “evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s 
interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a 
minor’ is ‘compelling.’”52  The Court went on to state that “the use of 
children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the 
physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child.  That judgment, 
we think, easily passes muster under the First Amendment.”53  Therefore, 
states have a paramount interest in preventing child sexual exploitation, and 
the limited artistic value of child pornography justified regulating such 
content outside the Miller obscenity standard.54  This made Miller’s inquiry 
into the average person’s prurient interest, the material’s portrayal of 
patently offensive sexual conduct, and the value of the work as a whole 
irrelevant in the child pornography context.55  As a result, consistent with 
the First Amendment, the government may regulate obscene speech that 
satisfies the Miller standard, and depictions of child pornography under 
Ferber. 
 
 47. Id. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)). 
 48. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 49. See id. at 75152. 
 50. Id. at 752. 
 51. Id. at 753. 
 52. Id. at 75657 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 
(1982)). 
 53. Id. at 758. 
 54. Id. at 75664 (enumerating five reasons to allow states more leeway to regulate child 
pornography than obscenity). 
 55. Id. at 76465; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 24950 (2002) 
(reaffirming the tenets of Ferber). 
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3. Freedom of Speech and the State’s Authority To Regulate Sexually 
Explicit Content Are Evolving in the Internet Age 
Precedent from Miller and Ferber has been strained as the contours of 
freedom of speech have shifted alongside the development and mass 
adoption of computer and Internet technology.  Like the telegraph, radio, 
telephone, and television in previous eras, the growth of the Internet as a 
“forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for 
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity” has 
revolutionized mass communication and information systems.56  Nearly 
three-fourths of Americans are now online,57 and the federal government 
continues to take measures to expand Internet access across the country.58  
Recent scholarship indicates that Americans of all ages are online between 
ten and fourteen hours per week.59 Each hour one hundred thousand new 
websites join the more than two billion pages already on the Internet;60 the 
U.S. Government alone maintains more than twenty-four thousand websites 
and resources online.61  Computers and the Internet are such prolific 
information sources and ubiquitous features of life that one expert claimed 
“without a computer in this day and age you can’t work, you can’t 
communicate, you can’t function as people normally do in modern 
society.”62 
 
 56. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2006); see BRUCE BIMBER, INFORMATION AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY:  TECHNOLOGY IN THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL POWER 7588 (2003); CARLA 
G. SURRATT, THE INTERNET AND SOCIAL CHANGE 15 (2001).  For an interesting discussion 
of the future of the Internet, see generally Symposium, Notes from the New World:  The 
Future of the Internet, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2751 (2010) (introducing “an exchange on 
theories of Internet governance”). 
 57. Internet Users (per 100 people), THE WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2 (last visited Sept. 23, 2010).  In 2009, 
seventy-seven million people, including forty-four percent of people living in poverty, used a 
public library to facilitate Internet access. Nearly One-Third of Americans Use Library to 
Access Internet, MEDIA ACCESS PROJECT (Mar. 26, 2010), 
http://www.mediaaccess.org/2010/03/nearly-one-third-of-americans-use-library-to-access-
internet/. 
 58. See Stephanie Condon, Stimulus Bill Includes $7.2 Billion for Broadband, CNET 
NEWS (Feb. 17, 2009, 9:40 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10165726-38.html. 
See generally The National Broadband Plan:  Connecting America, FCC, 
http://www.broadband.gov (last visited Sept. 23, 2010) (lauding the benefits of broadband 
Internet). 
 59. See VICTORIA RIDEOUT ET AL., THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 
GENERATION M2:  MEDIA IN THE LIVES OF 8- TO 18-YEAR-OLDS 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/8010.pdf; Lance Whitney, Average Net User Now 
Online 13 Hours Per Week, CNET NEWS (Dec. 23, 2009, 7:30 AM), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10421016-93.html. 
 60. STONE ET AL., supra note 21, at 345. 
 61. FED. WEB MANAGERS COUNCIL, PUTTING CITIZENS FIRST:  TRANSFORMING ONLINE 
GOVERNMENT 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.usa.gov/webcontent/documents/Federal_Web_Managers_WhitePaper.pdf. 
 62. Matt Richtel, Barring Web Use After Web Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003, at A1; 
see U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE:  ENTERING THE BROADBAND AGE 3 (2004), 
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/anol/NationOnlineBroadband04.pdf; JEFFREY I. 
COLE ET AL., THE UCLA INTERNET REPORT:  SURVEYING THE DIGITAL FUTURE 45 (2000), 
available at http://www.digitalcenter.org/pdf/InternetReportYearOne.pdf. 
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Additionally, the Internet has become an important tool for political and 
civic engagement.  Technology has driven democracy as millions of people 
have used the Internet to educate voters, contribute time and money to 
political candidates, and even cast a ballot.63  The Internet now functions as 
a modern public square, empowering each user with a virtual printing press 
and megaphone to disseminate their views.64  Scholar Lawrence Lessig 
described the Internet as “the most important model of free speech since 
[America’s] founding,” and noted that “the Net has taught us what the First 
Amendment means.”65  He also remarked that “[t]he model for speech that 
the framers embraced was the model of the Internetdistributed, 
noncentralized, fully free and diverse.”66  Floyd Abrams, a legendary First 
Amendment lawyer, has gone so far as to suggest that the Internet obviates 
the need for constitutional protection of speech because prior restraint on 
publication is no longer viable.67  Like speech in the material world, the 
government may not broadly regulate Internet speech without contravening 
the First Amendment, but it may regulate online the same obscene speech 
that it could regulate in the tangible world.68 
As the Internet has exploded in scope and importance, the Supreme Court 
has sought to adapt its precedent to the technological age.  The Supreme 
Court first ruled on government regulation of electronic content in Reno v. 
ACLU,69 where it invalidated, on First Amendment grounds, sections of a 
law that regulated online speech.70  To protect children online, Congress 
passed the Communications Decency Act of 1996,71 which made it a crime 
to transmit an obscene or indecent message that, like Miller, “depicts or 
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary 
 
 63. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (expounding on “the vast democratic 
forums of the Internet”); AARON SMITH ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE 
INTERNET AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 312 (2009), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/The_Internet_and_Civic_
Engagement.pdf; Kristen E. Larson, Cast Your Ballot.com:  Fulfill Your Civic Duty Over the 
Internet, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1797 (2001); Claire Cain Miller, How Obama’s Internet 
Campaign Changed Politics, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Nov. 7, 2008, 7:49 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/how-obamas-internet-campaign-changed-politics.  
States retain the power to restrict convicted felons, including child pornographers, from 
voting, online or otherwise. See Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 316 (1998). 
 64. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870 (using “chat rooms, any person with a phone line can 
become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. 
Through the use of Web pages . . . the same individual can become a pamphleteer”); 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE:  VERSION 2.0, at 236 (2006) (noting the Internet has eroded 
barriers to publication). 
 65. LESSIG, supra note 64, at 237.  Though extolling the Internet’s virtues, Lessig also 
believes it can and must be regulated. See id. at 2728. 
 66. Id., at 275. 
 67. See id. at 23741.  The recent controversy over publication by Wikileaks of 
classified documents related to the war in Afghanistan may buttress this assertion. See Brian 
Baxter, Lawyers Emerge from Wikileaks Shadows, AM. L. DAILY (July 26, 2010, 7:58 PM), 
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/07/wikileaks.html. 
 68. 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.61(n) (4th ed. 2007). 
 69. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 70. See id. at 849. 
 71. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994)). 
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community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.”72  The 
Court distinguished Internet speech from other communication, and held 
the law unconstitutional because it shielded minors by “suppress[ing] a 
large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive.”73 
Five years later, the Supreme Court again ruled on Internet speech 
regulation in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,74 where it rejected a ban on 
“virtual” child pornography.  The case arose when Congress passed the 
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA),75 which regulated 
computer generated images the Court defined as “virtual child 
pornography,”76 as well as images that implied a minor was engaged in a 
sexual act.77  The Supreme Court agreed with the erotic entertainers who 
had challenged the law,78 and found that the CPPA unduly restricted “the 
freedom to engage in a substantial amount of lawful speech.”79  Thus, the 
Court applied Ferber in the Internet context, and simultaneously reaffirmed 
the government’s sweeping power to regulate real child pornography but 
limited power to regulate online speech that is neither obscene nor child 
pornography. 
Later in 2002, in Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I),80 the Supreme Court 
temporarily sidestepped the question of the breadth of the government’s 
power to regulate Internet content.  In response to Reno,81 Congress had 
enacted the Child Online Protection Act (COPA),82 which criminalized 
commercial Internet postings deemed “harmful to minors”83 as defined by 
the three-part Miller standard.84  Reversing the Third Circuit, the Supreme 
Court held that COPA’s use of “community standards” to identify illicit 
content, without reference to a specific geographic area, did not alone 
render the law in violation of the First Amendment.85  However, the Court 
declined to rule whether COPA was overbroad for other reasons, and 
remanded the case to the Third Circuit to adjudicate those issues before the 
law would take effect.86 
 
 72. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1) (1994).  In 2003, this language was removed from the statute 
and replaced by “is obscene or child pornography.” Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 687 § 
603(2) (2003) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006)). 
 73. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 
74 (1983) (“The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that 
which would be suitable for a sandbox.”). 
 74. 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 75. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3026 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C. (1996)). 
 76. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 24142 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(b) (1994)). 
 77. See id. at 24243 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(d) (1994)). 
 78. Id. at 243. 
 79. Id. at 256. 
 80. 535 U.S. 564 (2002). 
 81. See supra notes 6873 and accompanying text. 
 82. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2736 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998)). 
 83. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1). 
 84. See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 56970 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 231); supra notes 4647 and 
accompanying text. 
 85. See id. at 58586. 
 86. See id. 
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The Supreme Court finally settled the issue in 2004 by reaffirming the 
central holding in Reno, namely that the government has only limited 
authority to restrict online speech.  In Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II),87 the 
Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s ruling,88 on remand from 
Ashcroft I,89 that COPA was unconstitutional because it did not use the least 
restrictive means to protect a minor from harmful online speech.90  The 
Court found that the government may encourage parents and schools to 
limit Internet access,91 but that it may not directly regulate Internet content 
without showing that the alternative filtering software was less effective in 
preventing harmful material from reaching children.92  In sum, the 
government could not take steps to block unprotected speech until it 
effectively determined how to separate it from protected speech.93  Ashcroft 
II set the standard for when the government may regulate the Internet, but 
left open the issue of when the government may entice Americans to 
consent to Internet speech regulations in exchange for a voluntary 
government benefit. 
B. The Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions 
While there is agreement that the unconstitutional conditions theory is 
needed to “constrain[] indirect governmental pressure on the exercise of 
constitutional rights, no easy or perhaps single rationale” exists to explain 
when a condition becomes unconstitutional.94  The idea has been a part of 
American jurisprudence for many years, and “has for just as long suffered 
from notoriously inconsistent application; it has never been an overarching 
principle of constitutional law” equally applied to individual rights and 
governmental powers.95  Among varied formulations, the gist of the theory 
is that the government may not voluntarily offer a benefit that requires a 
citizen to forego a constitutional right in order to take advantage of that 
 
 87. 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
 88. Id. at 66061. 
 89. See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 58586; supra notes 8086 and accompanying text. 
 90. See Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 66061. 
 91. See id. at 669670; United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) 
(plurality opinion). 
 92. See Ashcroft II, 542 U.S. at 66869. 
 93. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 83 (2006) (“[T]he problem for government’s efforts to control 
pornography is that it’s hard to distinguish it from stuff the U.S. government doesn’t want 
blocked, like artistic expression, sexual education, and news.”). 
 94. La. Pac. Corp. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 842 F. Supp. 1243, 124849 & 
n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1994); see also Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights:  Toward a Positive 
Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185, 1186 (1990) (“Despite 
wide acknowledgement of the doctrine’s importance in modern constitutional law, attempts 
to explain how it arises or what it does have been largely unsuccessful.”); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions and the Distribution of Liberty, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
327, 32730 (1989) (surveying the leading but flawed theories and proposing an alternative 
framework). 
 95. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 407 n.12 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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benefit.96  The doctrine pertains to an offer or conferral of a benefit by a 
state actor, including a federal court.97 
Though the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is centuries old, it 
remains difficult to predict when it applies, and, if it applies, when it is 
violated.  Part I.B of this Note reviews the development and theory of 
unconstitutional conditions to discern a method for evaluating the validity 
of computer and Internet restrictions as a condition of supervised release.  
First, it examines the foundation of unconstitutional conditions theory in 
commercial and employment cases.  Next, it explores the doctrine’s 
development in free speech and prisoner rights cases.  Finally, it distills the 
leading theories to posit a new framework whereby a condition is 
unconstitutional if it too stringently restricts protected speech and if the 
government’s offer is coercive or intended to regulate protected speech 
indirectly. 
1. Unconstitutional Conditions “Doctrine” Arose in Economic Cases and 
Developed to Encompass Speech and Individual Rights 
The theory of unconstitutional conditions was first articulated around the 
dawn of the twentieth century.  The Supreme Court gave life to the ideas 
behind the theory in Insurance Co. v. Morse,98 where it struck down a 
Wisconsin statute that prohibited insurance companies from transacting 
business in the state unless they agreed not to use the federal courts.99  The 
term “unconstitutional conditions” debuted two years later in a case re-
affirming Morse, when Justice Joseph P. Bradley wrote in dissent that, 
“Though a state may have the power, if it sees fit to subject its citizens to 
the inconvenience, of prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting 
business within its jurisdiction, it has no power to impose unconstitutional 
conditions upon their doing so.”100  The doctrine then laid dormant until the 
era of Lochner v. New York,101 when the Supreme Court repeatedly rejected 
state attempts to implement restrictive conditions on businesses.102  The 
 
 96. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15981608 (6th ed. 2009); 
Richard Epstein, Foreword:  Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of 
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 78 (1988); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 142122 (1989). 
 97. See supra note 96 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 
261 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting importance of judicial review of conditions of supervised 
release). 
 98. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874). 
 99. See id. at 45051. 
 100. Doyle v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535, 543 (1876) (Bradley, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Bradley supported the affirmation of Morse, but noted that the reasoning of the majority in 
Doyle, that “if the State may exclude [a company] without any cause, it may exclude them 
for a bad cause, is not sound.” Id. at 54344. 
 101. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 102. See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 59395 
(1926) (collecting cases rejecting state business regulations that required the “surrender of a 
right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold”). 
See generally 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 68, § 15.3 (discussing Lochner and 
economic liberty jurisprudence). 
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Court initially grounded unconstitutional conditions theory in economic 
freedom, but would later dramatically expand the scope of the doctrine. 
Two decades after the demise of Lochner, the Supreme Court broadened 
the reach of unconstitutional conditions theory to cover individual rights 
and free speech.  In Speiser v. Randall,103 California offered a property tax 
exemption to World War II veterans who signed an oath of loyalty to the 
state and federal governments.104  Veterans challenged the exemption on 
First Amendment grounds, saying the oath restricted their freedom of 
speech.105  The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the exemption was a 
government benefit and that the condition improperly infringed on their 
cognizable speech rights.106  Thus, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
became relevant to analyze a government benefit given in exchange for a 
personal waiver of an individual’s constitutional right. 
In subsequent years, the Supreme Court continued expanding the breadth 
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  The Court utilized the theory to 
strike down conditions on public employment,107 takings of property,108 
and receipt of federal funds.109  It also found a condition unconstitutional 
where receiving government unemployment benefits burdened religious 
exercise110 and where accepting public employment limited procedural due 
process.111  Nonetheless, the Court found the government complied with the 
doctrine in cases involving federalism,112 the tax code,113 and public 
financing of abortion.114  The Court also found unconstitutional conditions 
theory inapposite where a law conditioned the receipt of welfare benefits on 
 
 103. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
 104. Id. at 51417. 
 105. Id. at 517. 
 106. See id. at 51819 (“[T]he denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech 
necessarily will have the effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed 
speech.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 7879 (1990) (firing based 
on political patronage); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 80507 (1977) (retaining 
position conditioned on waiving right against self-incrimination). 
 108. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (finding right-of-way 
exaction non-germane to building permit). 
 109. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 39899 (1984) (limiting 
editorializing by public grant recipients). 
 110. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 71718 (1981) (striking requirement 
that pacifist Jehovah’s Witness work in armaments factory to receive unemployment 
benefits); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (rejecting welfare benefits 
conditioned on working Saturday). 
 111. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 59697 (1972). 
 112. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (conditioning highway funds on 
raising state drinking age). 
 113. See FCC, 468 U.S. at 400; Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 
U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (upholding spending restrictions on non-profit corporations). 
 114. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991) (banning use of federal funds for 
abortion-related activities); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312, 315 (1980) (prohibiting use 
of Medicaid funds for abortion). 
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a beneficiary consenting to a home visit by a state agency employee.115  In 
these varied holdings, however, the Court failed to delineate the 
circumstances that would make a condition pass constitutional muster. 
2. If Not All Fundamental Criminal Protections May Be Waived, When 
Does Offering Early Release from Prison Create an Unconstitutional 
Condition? 
As unconstitutional conditions doctrine expanded, its analysis became 
pertinent in situations where the government offered a convict a more 
lenient punishment, such as supervised release, in exchange for the waiver 
of a constitutional right.  This section discusses how courts have also 
examined a bargain that circumscribes the rights of a criminal or prisoner to 
determine whether it presents an unconstitutional condition.  The 
government may offer a benefit in exchange for a guilty plea,116 but it is 
difficult to predict whether it may offer a benefit conditioned on the waiver 
of a constitutional right. 
a. Waiver of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases 
The Supreme Court has permitted the waiver of constitutional criminal 
protections without becoming entangled in unconstitutional conditions 
analysis.  As the Court articulated in United States v. Mezzanatto,117 “a 
criminal defendant may knowingly and voluntarily waive many of the most 
fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution.”118  For example, a 
defendant may receive the benefit of a plea bargain in exchange for 
waiving, among other things, the right to trial by jury, right against self-
incrimination, and right to confront accusers.119  This may allow the 
government to trade a benefit for a right, even if there is unequal bargaining 
power, so long as the offer is similar to another choice the beneficiary 
faces.120  It is black letter law that “Waivers of constitutional rights not only 
 
 115. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971).  But see Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 288 n.12 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (interpreting consent 
search and waiver of right to trial as an unconstitutional condition). 
 116. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 36465 (1978).  See generally Jason 
Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801 (2003) (questioning dichotomy 
whereby some bargains are treated as criminal waivers and others as unconstitutional 
conditions). 
 117. 513 U.S. 196 (1995). 
 118. Id. at 201; see also Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (“The most 
basic rights of criminal defendants are . . . subject to waiver.”). 
 119. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 62829 (2002) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 
395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)). 
 120. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 42 (2002) (listing common choices facing 
inmates); Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 20910; see also Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2322 
(2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Litigants are put to similar voluntary choices between the 
rock and the whirlpool all the time . . . . It happens, for example, whenever a criminal 
defendant is offered a plea bargain that gives him a lesser sentence than he might otherwise 
receive but deprives him of his right to trial by jury and his right to appeal. It is indeed 
utterly commonplace that electing to pursue one avenue of relief may require the surrender 
of certain other remedies.”). 
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must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient 
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”121  
Importantly, though, the knowingness, intelligentness, and voluntariness 
that are required for a bona fide waiver are each a complicated legal idea 
subject to a separate standard; “the relinquishment of the right must have 
been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate 
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver 
must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right 
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.”122  
Where a convict is aware of the ramifications of his conduct and acts 
voluntarily, courts will often uphold the waiver of constitutional criminal 
rights outside the reach of unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
However, not all waivers of constitutional rights are acceptable; the 
government may not force a prisoner to choose between rights and death.  
In United States v. Jackson,123 the Supreme Court held the government 
acted improperly to force a choice between exercising the right to trial and 
risking capital punishment.124  Congress had passed the Federal Kidnapping 
Act,125 which authorized a jury to recommend the death penalty but made 
no such provision for someone who pleads guilty or waives the right to 
trial.126  The Court affirmed the district court’s holding that the provision 
was invalid because “it makes ‘the risk of death’ the price for asserting the 
right to jury trial.”127  The Court noted that no matter what the 
government’s objective in inducing the waiver, it “cannot be pursued by 
means that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.”128  
Since Jackson, the Supreme Court has found other limits on the state’s 
ability to bargain for a citizen’s constitutional rights, noting that some 
protections “are so fundamental to the reliability of the factfinding process 
that they may never be waived.”129  For example, the government may not 
offer a benefit in exchange for a waiver of the right to have conflict-free 
counsel,130 or the right to a speedy trial,131 because such a waiver may 
irreparably tip the scales of justice in the government’s favor.  Thus, the 
 
 121. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (internal citations omitted).  
 122. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (discussing waiver in Miranda warning 
context). 
 123. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
 124. Id. at 57172. 
 125. Pub. L. No. 72-189, 47 Stat. 326 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) 
(2006)). 
 126. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 571. 
 127. Id. at 57172 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 262 F. Supp. 716, 718 (D. Conn. 
1967)).  The Court later clarified that a guilty plea in the shadow of the death penalty is not 
invalid per se, but that the waiver of a constitutional right must be done knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 74748 (1970) 
(internal citations omitted); supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 128. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582. 
 129. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204 (1995). 
 130. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 15152 (2006) (citing Wheat v. 
United States, 486 U.S. 153, 15960 (1988)). 
 131. See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 50001 (2006); United States v. 
Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 35960 (2d Cir. 1995) (joining other circuits in so holding). 
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Court has insisted that there are limits on the waiver of a constitutional 
right, but has thus far declined to lay down a clear line for determining 
when that waiver becomes an unconstitutional condition. 
b. Waiver of Constitutional Rights in Prisoner Cases 
Just as the Court has set limits on the waiver of constitutional criminal 
rights, it has also found a prisoner’s ability to waive constitutional rights 
varies based on the level of incarceration.  Like criminal defendants, 
prisoners subject to harsher punishment have an ascending ability to waive 
constitutional rights, which gives the government greater power to offer 
conditions on release.  While an incarcerated prisoner retains some 
constitutional protection, the government may induce an inmate to waive a 
right where its penological interest in rehabilitation outweighs the impact 
on a convict’s liberty.132  For example, the government may offer leniency 
to someone on probation, parole, or supervised release on condition that the 
convict waive protection against warrantless searches, where the search 
would likely expose evidence of criminal activity.133  A condition may also 
be constitutional where the government has a strong interest in mitigating 
recidivism and using probation to help a prisoner reintegrate into society.134  
The prisoner’s limited power to consent does not taint the condition so long 
as it is assented to freely, and the option to reject the condition and remain 
in jail is preserved.135  Accordingly, the government’s power to entice 
waiver of a constitutional right is at its peak when dealing with an 
incarcerated convict, and decreases as the convict is given additional 
freedom. 
The government may also offer a benefit in exchange for a prisoner 
waiving his right not to speak without creating an unconstitutional 
condition.  In Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard,136 an incarcerated 
prisoner faced the difficult choice between foregoing parole by exercising 
his right to remain silent, or incriminating himself.137  The appellate court 
found the condition unconstitutional but the Supreme Court reversed, 
holding the doctrine not violated because the condition gave the prisoner a 
 
 132. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 36 (2002) (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 
482 U.S. 342, 348, 351 (1987)); see also supra notes 2429 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 
U.S. 112, 119 (2001); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 87273 (1987); United States v. 
Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 457 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 134. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 849, 853 (reminding the government that it need not ignore 
the likelihood of recidivism to protect constitutional rights); Knights, 534 U.S. at 118 
(upholding waiver condition because of state interest in effective probation system). 
 135. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 118; Reyes, 283 F.3d at 461.  See generally 5 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.10(b) (4th ed. 
2004) (explaining and criticizing the “act of grace” theory granting government absolute 
power to set release conditions). 
 136. 523 U.S. 272 (1998). 
 137. See Woodard, 523 U.S. at 279, 28586; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“[N]or 
shall [a person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”). 
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choice, albeit a tough one.138  As the Court noted, the prospect of voluntary 
parole did not create an expectation of release; requiring completion of a 
full prison term is not a per se unconstitutional condition.139  While the 
government may condition a convict’s release on waiving a constitutional 
right, it may not compel a waiver by using force or threatening to revoke 
the release.140  In the Fifth Amendment context, the government may offer 
a prisoner a voluntary benefit in exchange for waiving his right to remain 
silent without creating an unconstitutional conditions problem. 
3. Even the Supreme Court Cannot Decide When a Speech Restriction Is an 
Unconstitutional Condition? 
Though silence under the Fifth Amendment is not the same as speaking 
under the First Amendment, courts have inconsistently applied the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions in both prisoner and speech cases.  While 
limitations on speech by indigents, public employees, and protestors may 
present unconstitutional conditions, restrictions on speech as a condition of 
funding are often acceptable.  Though the Supreme Court rarely applies 
unconstitutional conditions theory outside the First Amendment context,141 
predicting the outcome of a case remains difficult because there is no clear 
demarcation between constitutional and unconstitutional conditions. 
a. Unconstitutional Conditions in Free Speech Cases 
Measures that curb speech by people in poverty, based on their economic 
status, may violate unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  In Legal Services 
Corp. v. Velazquez,142 the Supreme Court relied on unconstitutional 
conditions theory to strike down a condition that restricted indigent access 
to an attorney.143  Congress had funded a program to provide lawyers to 
assist poor clients in determining their eligibility for welfare benefits, on 
condition that those lawyers not challenge the statute underlying the state 
welfare regime.144  The Court rejected the restriction as an unconstitutional 
condition, reasoning that the government could not offer a vulnerable 
person a benefit that distorted the role of attorneys and the proper 
functioning of the judicial system by immunizing the law against legal 
challenge.145  Though Congress claimed that the restriction simply defined 
 
 138. See Woodard, 523 U.S. at 279, 28586; see also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 
4143 (2002) (“[W]hat constitutes unconstitutional compulsion involves a question of 
judgment.”); supra note 120 and accompanying text (noting difficult choices). 
 139. Compare Woodard, 523 U.S. at 28283 (“[D]enial of clemency merely means that 
the inmate must serve the sentence originally imposed.”),  with Greenholtz v. Inmates of the 
Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 1112 (1979) (holding that a statutorily-mandated 
early release provision created inmate expectation). 
 140. See McKune, 536 U.S. at 41; Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 43738 (1984). 
 141. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 108 (2d ed. 1988). 
 142. 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
 143. See id. at 54849. 
 144. Id. at 53739. 
 145. See id. at 544. 
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the scope of the program, the Court concluded, “Congress cannot recast a 
condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in every case, lest 
the First Amendment be reduced to a simple semantic exercise.”146 
The Supreme Court has also rejected public employment conditioned on 
limited exercise of free speech as an unconstitutional condition.  In 
Pickering v. Board of Education,147 where a public high school fired a 
teacher after he criticized its funding decisions,148 the Court 
“unequivocally” and “uniformly” rejected the idea that the government 
could condition public employment on free speech.149  Four years later, in 
Perry v. Sindermann,150 a state junior college failed to renew a professor’s 
employment contract after he criticized the school administration.151  In 
dicta, the Supreme Court noted that the government need not provide the 
benefit of public employment, but it could not deny the benefit by 
infringing freedom of speech because if “government could deny a benefit 
to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, 
his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited 
[which would] allow the government to ‘produce a result which [it] could 
not command directly.’  Such interference with constitutional rights is 
impermissible.”152  It took more than a century, but the Supreme Court has 
now firmly and explicitly rejected Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ famous 
dicta that the “petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but 
he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”153  While the government 
is not required to employ everyone, it may not employ only those people 
willing to accept limits on their First Amendment rights. 
Additionally, a condition may be unconstitutional where the government 
promulgates it to stifle dissent.  In National Endowment for the Arts v. 
Finley,154 the Court upheld a federal appropriations law155 that prohibited 
grants to support artwork deemed obscene and without cultural value, 
including depictions of sexual conduct by children.156  The Court stressed 
that the government may not be required to subsidize all speech protected 
by the First Amendment, and that choosing to support one type of art, but 
not another, may not operate as an unconstitutional condition.157  However, 
 
 146. Id. at 547. 
 147. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 148. Id. at 564. 
 149. See id. at 568. 
 150. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 
 151. Id. at 59495. 
 152. Id. at 597 (alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 
(1958)); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 14344 (1983) (explicating the history of 
unconstitutional burdens on speech in public employment cases). 
 153. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892); see O’Hare 
Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 71617 (1996) (rejecting Homes’ 
dicta); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (same). 
 154. 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
 155. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 741 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (2006)). 
 156. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 572, 575. 
 157. See id. at 58688; see also supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for the majority, warned that “in the 
provision of subsidies, the Government may not ‘ai[m] at the suppression of 
dangerous ideas,’”158 or take affirmative steps “calculated to drive ‘certain 
ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’”159  In those unique situations 
where the right to speak freely is most important, such as indigence, public 
employment, and protest, the government’s offer of a voluntary benefit in 
exchange for limited speech would be an unconstitutional limitation on the 
First Amendment. 
b. Constitutional Conditions in Free Speech Cases 
However, the Supreme Court has allowed the government to limit speech 
as a condition of receiving federal funds without finding it created an 
unconstitutional condition.  In Rust v. Sullivan,160 the Court upheld a 
provision that restricted recipients of federal family planning funds, under 
Title X of the Public Health Service Act,161 from engaging in abortion-
related activities.162  While the doctors who provided services under the 
program contended the condition violated their right to free speech, the 
Court instead noted that the law did not deny a benefit but merely required 
recipients to comply by segregating abortion-related activities from 
permissible activities using federal funds.163  The Court distinguished the 
case from other unconstitutional conditions because the restriction was on a 
program rather than on the individual receiving the benefit, which preserved 
the individual’s right to speak out without jeopardizing the group’s public 
funding.164  Following prior precedent, which permitted certain restrictions 
on speech by recipients of federal funds—though without consistent 
reasoning—the Rust Court upheld the limitation in the face of an 
unconstitutional conditions challenge.165 
Most recently, in United States v. American Library Ass’n,166 a plurality 
of the Court agreed that requiring libraries to install Internet content filters 
before receiving federal subsidies complied with the unconstitutional 
 
 158. Id. at 587 (alteration in original) (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation of 
Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983)). 
 159. Id. (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)). 
 160. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 161. 42 U.S.C. § 300300a-6 (2008). 
 162. Rust, 500 U.S. at 17778; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 32627 (1980) 
(finding no right to government-funded abortion). 
 163. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196200. 
 164. See id. at 197. 
 165. See id. at 178; see also, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 21112 (1987) 
(upholding funding condition where money could be rejected); Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 
U.S. 555, 575 (1984) (same); SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 115; cf. Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009) (discussing Free Speech Clause’s inapplicability to 
government speech).  But see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 837 (1995) (rejecting selective use of funds to deny support to religious newspaper); 
supra notes 14246 and accompanying text (reviewing the Court’s rejection of funding 
restrictions in Legal Servs. Corp.). 
 166. 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
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conditions doctrine.167  The district court found a condition on federal 
subsidies, included in the Children’s Internet Protection Act,168 to be 
unconstitutional because it required libraries to limit patron access to 
constitutionally protected speech.169  However, a plurality of Justices 
reversed, noting that libraries traditionally did not offer all protected 
content, including pornography, and therefore the law did not induce a First 
Amendment violation.170  Furthermore, libraries remained free to provide 
unfiltered Internet access without federal funds, and the government had 
plenary authority to add conditions to programs it had created.171  While 
resolving the issue of the day, the Court did not address the framework to 
be used to determine when a technology restriction becomes an 
unconstitutional condition. 
4. Offering a New Framework for Unconstitutional Conditions Analysis:  
Applying Coercion-Purpose-Effect to a Condition That Restricts Access to 
Technology 
As courts developed the theory of unconstitutional conditions through 
commercial and individual rights cases, they failed to create a clear line for 
determining when a condition was constitutional in both the prisoner and 
speech contexts.  Confronted with these inconsistent rulings, scholars have 
devised a number of theories to reconcile the cases.  While there is 
agreement that an unconstitutional conditions problem may occur when the 
government conditions the receipt of a voluntary benefit on the waiver of a 
constitutional right,172 efforts to create a coherent doctrine to explain the 
theory have long been controversial.173  This section proposes a novel 
structure for determining when a condition is unconstitutional by first 
discussing various modes of reasoning in unconstitutional conditions cases, 
and then proposing a new three-prong framework for evaluating a specific 
condition.  The first prong, coercion, ascertains whether a convict is fully 
empowered to accept or reject the condition.  The second prong, purpose, 
 
 167. See id. at 214. 
 168. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-335 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 
254(h) (2000)). 
 169. See Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 199200. 
 170. See id. at 21112. 
 171. See id. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)); see also supra note 165 and 
accompanying text. 
 172. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 173. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Too Hard:  Unconstitutional Conditions and the 
Chimera of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular 
Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990).  Professor 
Sunstein has all but dismissed the theory of unconstitutional conditions, saying, “all 
constitutional cases are really unconstitutional conditions cases. Whenever the government 
penalizes speech, it is conditioning a right that it has granted.” SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 
11718.  A century ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes described unconstitutional 
conditions as a “fallacy.” W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 54 
(1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see supra note 153 and accompanying text (spurning 
Holmes’ narrow view of speech rights afforded to public employees). 
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scrutinizes whether the government had a legitimate security or 
rehabilitative reason for offering the condition.  The third prong, effect, 
evaluates the cost to societal speech rights incurred because of the 
condition.  Part II then uses this Note’s framework to do what courts have 
not done:  analyze whether a limit on computer and Internet use as part of 
supervised release is an unconstitutional condition. 
a. Existing Theories for Understanding Unconstitutional Conditions 
Unconstitutional conditions analysis first focused on the inalienability of 
constitutional rights.  The Supreme Court relied on this reasoning in its first 
unconstitutional conditions case,174 and more recently, Justice William O. 
Douglas argued the position in dissent, stressing that the government should 
not be permitted “to ‘buy up’ rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”175  
Using traditional contract principles, commentators argued that because a 
citizen could not forfeit constitutional rights, they were invalid as 
consideration in a contract.176  In this context, a speech condition may be 
unacceptable even if the waiver occurs knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily.177  Though initially viable, the inalienability theory of 
unconstitutional conditions is now uncommon outside conditions involving 
private actors.178 
An alternative theory for analyzing the constitutionality of a condition 
focused on the type of benefit offered.  This approach “separat[ed] denials 
of benefits that ‘penalize’ speech (unconstitutional conditions) from those 
that merely refrain from subsidizing speech (constitutionally valid 
conditions).”179  However, the paradigm became untenable once the Court 
engaged in the same unconstitutional conditions inquiry whether it 
considered a benefit to be a privilege or a right.180  Scholars noted the 
inconsistency of these distinctions, and endeavored to explain the Court’s 
rulings on unconstitutional conditions. 
 
 174. See Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (stating that a citizen 
cannot “barter away” life, freedom, or rights). 
 175. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 328 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see supra 
notes 9899 and accompanying text (discussing Morse). 
 176. See Sullivan, supra note 94, at 330 (hypothesizing a theory that “treat[s] 
constitutional rights as inalienable: some reason keeps them off the government benefits 
‘market.’”); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403 
(2009) (offering framework for adjusting inalienability rules); Steven G. Gey, Contracting 
Away Rights:  A Comment on Daniel Farber’s “Another View of the Quagmire”, 33 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 953 (2006) (disputing the extent of rights alienability). 
 177. Cf. Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 75–76 (9th Cir. 1962) (rejecting 
suspension of prison sentence on condition of leaving United States despite option to choose 
prison); supra notes 12122 and accompanying text. 
 178. See Sullivan, supra note 96, at 1477. 
 179. CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  POWERS AND LIBERTIES 241 (3d 
ed. 2009). 
 180. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 40405 (1963); see also William W. Van 
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. 
REV. 1439 (1968). 
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Modern commentators have focused on different elements of 
unconstitutional conditions theory.  Some have highlighted the doctrine’s 
use in restricting the government’s power to coerce citizens into giving up 
rights, which prevents indirect regulation of protected rights and mitigates 
the government’s monopoly power.181  Critics, however, emphasized that 
judging coercion depends on the baseline because a benefit with a condition 
is usually better than no benefit, whereas an unconditional benefit is usually 
superior to a conditional benefit.182  Meanwhile, others used contract law 
and cases in the waiver context to explain that a condition may be 
constitutional where the government need not offer the benefit, and the 
recipient nevertheless accepted it freely.183  This Note draws on all three 
camps to develop a new three-prong framework for evaluating the validity 
of conditions. 
b. A New Three-Prong Framework:  Coercion-Purpose-Effect 
The first prong of this Note’s framework looks to whether the 
government’s offer of a conditional benefit is coercive.  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines coercion as “Compulsion by physical force or threat of 
physical force,”184 but much ink has been spilled in seeking to pinpoint the 
tipping point of governmental influence in the unconstitutional conditions 
context.185  This is partly because, first, a baseline for judging governmental 
pressure must be identified, and second, the effect that pressure had on 
decision making must be determined.186  The government may be acting 
coercively when it voluntarily offers a conditional benefit as a means for 
changing how a private actor would have otherwise behaved.187  For 
example, an offer may be coercive where the benefit is so valuable, or 
condition so harmful, that the putative beneficiary is faced with a Hobson’s 
choice, with no real choice but to accept.188  In contrast, the state may not 
be acting coercively, according to traditional contract law, where the 
beneficiary is not compelled to accept the conditional offer but rather 
 
 181. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 1216 (1993); Kreimer, 
supra note 22, at 129697; Sullivan, supra note 96, at 141922. 
 182. See, e.g., STONE ET AL., supra note 96, at 1605; Baker, supra note 94, at 119192; 
Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines:  Unconstitutional Conditions in Three 
Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 1520 (2001).  Professor Berman’s three dimensions for 
viewing unconstitutional conditions are purpose, effects, and conduct. See id. at 1542. 
 183. See Epstein, supra note 96, at 10; Daniel A. Farber, Another View of the Quagmire:  
Unconstitutional Conditions and Contract Theory, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 92426 
(2006); Sullivan, supra note 96, at 1417. 
 184. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 294 (9th ed. 2009). 
 185. See Berman, supra note 182, at 12 (explaining that “[t]he scholarship has concluded 
that coercion is a dead end”); Sullivan, supra note 96, at 1420 (“Neither the Court nor the 
commentary . . . has developed a satisfying theory of what is coercive about unconstitutional 
conditions.”). 
 186. See Berman, supra note 182, at 1219; Sullivan, supra note 94, at 328; Sullivan, 
supra note 96, at 142856; Sunstein, supra note 173, at 60104. 
 187. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 11516. 
 188. See Sullivan, supra note 96, at 143343; supra notes 11731 and accompanying text 
(illustrating coercion in waiver cases). 
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chooses to accept it under his own free will after thoughtful 
consideration.189  The difficulty of defining coercion in each case 
necessitates additional prongs to more precisely decipher when a condition 
is unconstitutional. 
The second prong of this Note’s proposed framework for evaluating 
unconstitutional conditions looks to whether the government has a valid 
purpose behind its offer of a conditional benefit.  The state’s purpose may 
be illegitimate where it induces the waiver of a constitutional right when it 
could not directly regulate that right.190  This focuses the inquiry “not on 
whether the beneficiary is free to refuse an offer, but on whether 
government should be free to make it.”191  As such, the State may not 
bargain for a constitutional right where it lacks a germane, neutral, and non-
censorial interest in the condition.192  However, the government may offer a 
bargain where it has a penological, public safety, or rehabilitative interest, 
and the condition shows the government is acting to advance one of those 
interests.193  The coercion and purpose prongs work in tandem; 
coerciveness will decrease as the government’s purpose becomes more 
proper, and, conversely, a showing of a proper purpose may aid the 
government in disproving claims of undue coercion.194 
Finally, the third prong of this Note’s framework looks to a condition’s 
effect on the aggregate level of speech available to society.  A condition 
may be unconstitutional where the government’s use of monopoly power 
creates a collective action problem, whereby its burden on one right limits 
the power to exercise another right.195  For example, while the government 
may exact a waiver from one citizen, collecting waivers from many citizens 
reduces society’s ability to exercise that right.196  Examining the effect of a 
 
 189. See Farber, supra note 183, at 937 (hypothesizing about voluntary consent to be 
searched); supra notes 16071 and accompanying text (discussing Rust, Am. Library Ass’n, 
and government funding conditions); see also JOHN CALAMARI & JOSEPH PERILLO, 
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(pointing out that the Court has rejected conditions that “might deter or entirely prevent the 
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 196. See STONE ET AL., supra note 96, at 160304; SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 115; 
Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City Of Tigard:  Constitutional Rights As Public Goods, 72 
DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 879 (1995); supra note 195 accompanying text (discussing collective 
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condition also prevents the government from using its advantage to restrict 
rights for a particular group of citizens, which would create a lower class of 
rights-holders,197 or enforcing a waiver that harms a third party.198  
Consequently, like in the government funding cases,199 a condition’s effect 
may be satisfactorily narrow where the government offers a benefit in 
exchange for a condition, within its regulatory powers, that it could instead 
have imposed directly.200  The third prong is necessary but not sufficient; a 
condition that has an acceptable effect will not automatically be 
constitutional, but may be if the condition also passes the coercion and 
purpose prongs of this Note’s framework. 
To summarize this Note’s new three-prong framework, a condition is 
unconstitutional where the government coerces a beneficiary into accepting 
its offer, or where the government has an improper purpose for pursuing a 
condition.  However, because the government is less likely to act coercively 
where it has a legitimate motive, and vice-versa, the effect prong judges 
whether a condition overly restricts protected speech as a backstop for 
invalid conditions that satisfy the coercion and purpose prongs.  While this 
framework is new, courts have already discussed the theory of 
unconstitutional conditions in prison and free speech cases.  However, 
courts have not considered the doctrine in hybrid cases where the 
government offers a convict supervised release with a restriction on 
computer and Internet access. 
c. Using This Note’s New Three-Part Framework To Analyze a Supervised 
Release Condition That Limits Access To Technology 
Though courts have not so scrutinized a supervised release condition that 
circumscribes computer and Internet access, this Note posits that such a 
limitation may present an unconstitutional condition because the 
government is offering a voluntary benefit conditioned on the waiver of a 
constitutional right.201  The government benefit comes in the form of an 
offer of supervised release, which it is not obligated to provide because a 
criminal conviction forfeits one’s right to liberty until the sentence is 
completed.202  Moreover, that offer is a benefit because freedom is 
 
 197. See Sullivan, supra note 96, at 149899. 
 198. See EPSTEIN, supra note 181, at 6971. 
 199. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 200. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 201. There is no standard condition, but a common version states that the convict “shall 
not have[,] possess or have access to computers [or] the Internet” during the release term. 
United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 160 (5th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting the 
district court’s conditions); see also United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 
2003) (“[Holm] shall not possess or use a computer that is equipped with a modem, that 
allows access to any part of the Internet, e-mail service, or other ‘on-line’ services.”); United 
States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“[Peterson] shall not 
possess, purchase, or use a computer or computer equipment . . . .”). 
 202. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); 
United States v. Woods, 547 F.3d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 2008) (“It is axiomatic that the 
infringement of constitutional liberties occurs concomitantly with conviction of a crime . . . .”) 
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valuable, and accepting supervised release affords a convict more freedom 
than incarceration.203  The conditional waiver creates an unconstitutional 
conditions concern when the government requires that the convict choose 
between accepting the benefit and retaining the free speech rights to which 
he is entitled while on supervised release.204  A condition that restricts 
Internet speech may violate that right where it needlessly prevents a convict 
from accessing the principal modern means for communication and 
participation in public life.205  To complete this analysis, Part II reframes 
the reasoning of courts that assessed the validity of a computer and Internet 
restriction on other grounds to answer the question not yet asked:  does an 
offer of supervised release with a condition that curbs computer and 
Internet use create an unconstitutional condition? 
II. APPLYING THE COERCION-PURPOSE-EFFECT FRAMEWORK:  IS A 
SUPERVISED RELEASE RESTRICTION ON COMPUTER AND INTERNET ACCESS 
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION? 
Since the dawn of the Internet, courts have wrestled with how to punish 
criminals convicted of computer crimes related to child pornography.  
Many of these cases present similar facts:  law enforcement, whether via tip 
or sting operation,206 catches a male possessing or distributing child 
pornography.207  Threatened with harsh punishment,208 he pleads guilty and 
submits himself for sentencing before a judge.209  The trial judge, with 
input from the Probation Office, prosecutor, and defendant, sentences the 
convict to serve jail time, followed by a term of supervised release, with a 
 
(internal citations omitted); see Sullivan, supra note 96, at 142226; supra note 34 and 
accompanying text. 
 203. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 911 (juxtaposing level and value of liberty in a variety 
of early release contexts). 
 204. See Sullivan, supra note 96, at 142628; supra notes 41, 18788 and accompanying 
text. 
 205. See supra notes 62, 6466 and accompanying text; Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 
542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (describing potentially permissible restrictions on Internet speech). 
 206. See, e.g., United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 268 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1109 (2010); Paul, 274 F.3d at 158. 
 207. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 387 (3d Cir. 2003); Paul, 274 
F.3d at 158; see also supra note 15 (noting men commit most child pornography crimes). 
 208. See Mike Scarcella, Prosecutors in Child Pornography Case To Seize Residence, 
NAT’L L.J. (July 7, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432025815; Eighth 
Circuit Affirms Big Real Property Forfeiture For Child Porn Offense, SENT’G L. & POL’Y 
(May 26, 2010, 12:24 pm) http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencing_law_and_policy/2010/05/eighth-circuit-affirms-big-real-property-forfeiture-for-
child-porn-offense.html (discussing United States v. Hull, 606 F.3d 524 (8th Cir. 2010)).  
But see United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516, 533 (6th Cir. 2009) (Merritt, J., dissenting) 
(comparing child pornography sentencing trends to “witchcraft trials and burnings”), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 187 (2009); Efrati, supra note 13 (reporting on reevaluation of sentencing 
guidelines for computer child pornography crimes); Lynne Marek, Sentences for Possession 
of Child Porn May Be Too High, Judges Say, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 10, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/newswire/cache/1202433693658.html. 
 209. See, e.g., Thielemann, 575 F.3d at 269; United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 874 
(7th Cir. 2003); Paul, 274 F.3d at 158. 
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condition that restricts computer and Internet access.210  Then the convict 
appeals, contending that the trial court abused the discretion allowed by the 
sentencing guidelines, and asks the appellate body to strike the supervised 
release condition.211 
Building on the discussion of the First Amendment and unconstitutional 
conditions theory in Part I, Part II analyzes whether a condition of 
supervised release that restricts computer and Internet access creates an 
unconstitutional condition.  It does so first by analyzing the cases that have 
considered these conditions, then, second, by recasting these decisions to fit 
this Note’s three-prong framework to determine whether a condition is 
unconstitutional.  First, Part II.A takes up the coercion prong, considering 
cases where the government’s conditional offer compelled a convict to 
waive a constitutional right and where it did not.  Next, Part II.B evaluates 
the purpose prong, discussing where the government’s intent in offering a 
condition was valid and where it was not.  Then, Part II.C assesses the 
effect prong, explaining where the condition’s consequence was acceptable 
and where it was overbroad. 
A. Prong One:  When Is a Condition Coercive? 
This section discusses the divergent views regarding the coerciveness of 
a condition of supervised release that restricts computer and Internet access.  
First, it explains that some courts find that the government acts coercively 
where a convict cannot realistically reject its conditional offer of freedom 
with limited computer and Internet use.  Then, it refashions the reasoning of 
these courts to fit the coercion prong of this Note’s framework.  Next, it 
explores the opposing view—that the government does not act coercively 
where a convict voluntarily agrees to accept its conditional offer as the price 
for liberty, and then again reframes the logic of these latter courts in terms 
of the coercion prong of this Note’s framework. 
1. A Condition May Be Coercive If the Government Leaves a Convict No 
Choice but To Accept the Offer and Restriction 
Courts have found that the government may be acting coercively when it 
offers a convict a condition of supervised release that restricts all access to 
Internet and computer technology.  The government purports to offer the 
convict a voluntary choice between accepting a lifetime term of supervised 
release, without computer or Internet access, and spending more time in 
jail.212  However, courts have rejected such absolute limitations, even 
where a condition included an exception that allowed computer use for 
word processing,213 because a convict may be incapable of balancing his 
 
 210. See, e.g., United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 12425 (2d Cir. 2002); Paul, 274 
F.3d at 15960; see also supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 212. See Doe v. Marion Cnty., 566 F. Supp. 2d 862, 87879 (S.D. Ind. 2008). 
 213. See United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1205 n.7 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding a 
modem inside a standard computer may render a restriction absolute).  But see Thielemann, 
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inherent liberty interest with the impact of “lifetime cybernetic banishment” 
that forfeits access to the critical technology that has permeated daily 
life.214  For example, in United States v. White,215 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit overturned a condition that restricted all 
Internet and computer use because it would have made modern life 
functionally impossible.216  The court found the condition placed the 
convict in a no-win situation where he would no longer be incarcerated but 
would gain freedom in a Potemkin village, without the ability to visit a 
library, café, or airport.217  Other circuits have followed this reasoning, 
rejecting a similar condition because it would have rendered life outside of 
prison “exceptionally difficult” by preventing a convict from filing taxes 
electronically, engaging in online commerce, and accessing government 
resources on the Internet.218  Moreover, the length of a term of supervised 
release magnifies the prohibition’s impact, leading courts to reject a lifetime 
condition but approve a similar condition of limited duration.219  The 
prospect of trading a prison term for life without the use of important 
technology has given courts reason to reject a restrictive condition on 
supervised release. 
A condition that completely restricts computer and Internet access may 
be coercive and fail the first prong of this Note’s framework for 
unconstitutional conditions.  A condition that leaves a convict no functional 
choice but to accept is the archetype of altered decision making, as few 
would voluntarily choose to forego access to Internet and computer 
technology.220  Though the prisoner does get the valuable benefit of 
freedom in exchange, the state’s threat to keep a convict imprisoned may be 
sufficiently powerful to entice him to agree to give up the modern day 
mailbox, telephone, bank, storage cabinet, and key to the world’s combined 
knowledge.221  This makes the condition arguably similar to pleading guilty 
to avoid the threat of capital punishment, where a convict cannot rationally 
weigh the true costs, benefits, and impact of a fundamentally life-altering 
 
575 F.3d at 278 (approving condition that permitted word processing on computer 
unconnected to the Internet). 
 214. United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 148 & n.8 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing 
computers in cars, automatic teller machines, televisions, appliances, and temperature 
controls); see United States v. Silvious, 512 F.3d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[A] total ban on 
the use of computers with access to the Internet is in most cases an overbroad condition of 
supervised release.”); United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 73637 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting 
complete Internet ban); cf. Doe, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 879 (rejecting illusory choice between 
consenting to condition and being prosecuted). 
 215. 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 216. See id. at 120506 (reading release condition as absolute). 
 217. See id. at 1205; Doe, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 879. 
 218. United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 87778 (7th Cir. 2003); see, e.g., United States 
v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 402, 408 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2010); Scott, 316 F.3d at 736; United 
States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 8384 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
 219. See, e.g., Heckman, 592 F.3d at 40509 (distinguishing Third Circuit precedent); 
United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 985, 988 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 220. See supra notes 18788 and accompanying text; cf. Doe, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 879. 
 221. United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 183 (2d Cir. 2004) (emphasizing the 
multifaceted nature of a computer); see supra notes 18687 and accompanying text. 
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choice.222  Some courts would likely find that a condition would be 
unconstitutional where a convict’s will would be overborne by the state’s 
alluring offer, leaving him powerless to reject a lifetime condition and 
constructively coerced into accepting it. 
2. However, a Condition May Not Be Coercive If a Convict Knowingly and 
Voluntarily Accepts the Bargain 
Under other circumstances, courts have upheld the government’s offer of 
conditional release where the convict made an informed decision about 
whether to remain incarcerated or accept freedom with a restriction on 
computer and Internet use.  For example, in United States v. Daniels,223 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit accepted a lifetime term of 
release that limited computer and Internet use because the government had 
offered the convict the choice of either remaining in lockup or gaining 
freedom with a condition, and the convict expressly, knowingly, and 
voluntarily accepted.224  The court noted that using contract principles to 
evaluate a condition would protect a convict because a voluntary agreement 
would be ineffective unless the government fully informed the convict 
about the agreement’s details and assent was not forced.225  Moreover, 
understanding the terms of a condition had put the convict on notice, and 
vindicated the imposition of a technology condition as punishment for 
violating more lenient terms of release.226  Other circuits have approved an 
absolute restriction for a limited duration, finding a convict could reject the 
benefit because, though “computers and the Internet have become 
significant and ordinary components of modern life as we know it, they 
nevertheless still are not absolutely essential to a functional life outside of 
prison.”227  While a convict could not easily reject the offer of a valuable 
conditional benefit, courts have found meaningful distinctions between 
voluntary and coerced acceptance. 
 
 222. See supra notes 124, 18889 and accompanying text. 
 223. 541 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1600 (2009). 
 224. See id. at 92324; see also Heckman, 592 F.3d at 407 n.9 (surveying acceptance of 
lifetime bans in other circuits); United States v. Stolte, 357 F. App’x 943, 944 (9th Cir. 
2009) (citing Daniels, 541 F.3d at 92224).  But see United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 
148 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that as of 2007, no circuit had, in a precedential opinion, 
approved a lifetime term of supervised release without computer and Internet access). 
 225. See, e.g., United States v. Cope, 527 F.3d 944, 94955 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 321 (2008); United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 73436 (7th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391 (3d Cir. 2003) (remanding case where reason for 
condition not explained). 
 226. See, e.g., United States v. Tome, No. 09-16486, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16239, at *4 
(11th Cir. July 27, 2010); United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302, 130911 (11th Cir. 
2005) (imposing condition after probation violation).  But see United States v. White, 244 
F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (rejecting technology condition imposed after convict violated 
prior condition barring alcohol consumption). 
 227. United States v. Brigham, 569 F.3d 220, 234 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
1013 (2009); see Scott, 316 F.3d at 73637; United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 170 (5th 
Cir. 2001). 
248 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
Recasting the reasoning of courts that have upheld a limit on computer 
and Internet use in light of this Note’s framework, and relying on contract 
law, a voluntary waiver would likely pass the coercion prong where a 
convict has the power to reject the benefit and condition.  This would allow 
the convict to choose the option he deems in his best interest, which could 
be conditional release, and permits a convict to trade speech rights for 
liberty while saving taxpayers the cost of incarceration.228  Following this 
paradigm, the court best protects a prisoner’s rights by ensuring he is fully 
informed and understands the potential long-term impacts of any 
agreement.  In this vein, a knowledgeable convict who voluntarily chose to 
accept the benefit of release and corresponding burden may be more like an 
organization electing to accept conditional federal funds, and the court may 
determine coercion was not involved.229  This analogy justifies courts that 
have analyzed a supervised release condition from a contract perspective, 
and found no coercion in a voluntary agreement between the state and 
prisoner. 
B. Prong Two:  When Is the Government’s Purpose Improper? 
Like the coercion issue, courts have split on analyzing the government’s 
motive for offering a condition of release.  This section highlights the 
decisions of courts that have ruled on the validity of the government’s 
purpose for offering a condition of supervised release that limits technology 
access.  First, it explains that some courts find the government’s purpose 
may be improper where a condition is unrelated to the crime and shows the 
government intends to regulate speech indirectly.  Then, it reframes the 
reasoning of these courts to fit the purpose prong of this Note’s framework.  
Next, it addresses the opposite view, juxtaposing the position that the 
government’s purpose may be valid where it acts to boost public safety and 
offers exceptions to a condition.  Finally, it recasts the reasoning of courts 
that have upheld a condition to fit the second prong of this Note’s 
unconstitutional conditions framework. 
1. The Government May Have an Inappropriate Motive Where It Uses a 
Condition To Regulate Protected Speech Indirectly 
Courts have found that the government has an improper purpose for 
restricting computer and Internet use where the condition regulates activity 
unrelated to the underlying crime.  The government bears a high burden to 
articulate a legitimate reason for pursuing an expansive condition, and must 
fully explain the basis for the condition such that it does not leave the 
convict speculating about the state’s intention.230  Courts have found this 
 
 228. See Scott, 316 F.3d at 73637; supra notes 189, 193 and accompanying text; see 
also Budget Woes Have States Rethinking Prison Policy, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2009, at A3. 
 229. See Daniels, 541 F.3d at 92324; supra notes 16471 and accompanying text. 
 230. See United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 18384, 188 (3d Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 879 (7th 
Cir. 2003). 
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standard unmet where there was an insufficient nexus between the condition 
and the child pornography crime for which it was imposed.231  For example, 
in United States v. Peterson,232 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, in a bank larceny case, rejected a condition that prevented a convict 
from purchasing, using, or possessing a computer because the condition 
pertained to a previous sex offense.233  The court reasoned that the failure to 
pursue a condition in an earlier case did not excuse its irrelevance in a later 
case where it regulated a convict’s employment that was unrelated to the 
reason for the sentence of supervised release.234  Other circuits have used 
similar reasoning, finding the government had an improper motive where a 
supervised release condition given for a child pornography crime sought to 
limit access to legal adult pornography,235 where technology was not an 
integral part of the crime,236 or where the ban would prevent the convict 
from securing employment.237  While the government may pursue 
supervised release for a variety of reasons, it must narrowly tailor the 
condition to the crime that gives rise to the particular punishment. 
A lifetime term of supervised release that limits computer and Internet 
access but does not include an exception might also show the government 
has an improper purpose for pursuing the condition.  For example, courts 
have been uncomfortable with a lifelong condition imposed as part of 
supervised release because of the unknown future consequences and 
potential to limit the speech of a convict who is later rehabilitated.238  As a 
result, some courts have found the government evinced an invalid purpose 
by not including an exception that would allow a probation officer, at her 
discretion, to grant the convict computer and Internet access in the 
 
 231. See Miller, 594 F.3d at 18788 (explaining distinctions in Third Circuit cases based 
on whether the Internet was used to solicit sexual contact with a child); United States v. 
Bender, 566 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting Eighth Circuit allows expansive condition 
where physical contact with minor was sought, but not for receipt or possession of child 
pornography). 
 232. 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
 233. See id. at 8183. 
 234. See id. at 8283; see also United States v. T.M., 330 F.3d 1235, 124041 (9th Cir. 
2003) (vacating condition imposed in drug case related to sex crimes committed twenty and 
forty years prior); United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 632, 636 (8th Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
condition for bank robbery crime due to convicted rape fifteen years earlier). 
 235. See, e.g., United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 7677 (1st Cir. 2009); 
Voelker, 489 F.3d at 15053; United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 114142 (9th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 263, 26667 (3d Cir. 2001); see also United 
States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 154 & n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 300 (2009) 
(clarifying the approach of other circuits); United States v. Wilkinson, 282 F. App’x 750, 
754 (11th Cir. 2008) (highlighting circuit split on the issue). 
 236. See, e.g., United States v. Silvious, 512 F.3d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 2008) (castigating 
Internet ban as overbroad in mail fraud case where defendant merely corresponded over e-
mail); United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) (rejecting technology 
condition imposed when convict violated parole by drinking alcohol). 
 237. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 600 F.3d 631, 63738 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stressing 
that McDonald’s and PETCO require computer use to complete job application and duties, 
respectively); United States v. Holm 326 F.3d 872, 87778 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 238. See Voelker, 489 F.3d at 148; supra notes 214, 21819 and accompanying text 
(describing reasons to reject lifetime conditions).  But see infra notes 24749, 25153 and 
accompanying text (noting approval of lifetime conditions). 
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future.239  Though including a Probation Office exception could create 
concerns about the court’s power to delegate sentencing,240 it may also 
show that the government is pursuing the condition in good faith and not 
seeking to limit speech indirectly.241  Incorporating an exception that allows 
a convict computer and Internet access may not make a condition per se 
acceptable, but may ease a court’s reluctance to find the government 
harbored a valid purpose for pursuing a condition. 
Recasting the reasoning of courts that have rejected a technology access 
condition to fit the second prong of this Note’s framework, a condition that 
restricts activity unrelated to the crime, or lacks an exception, may fail 
because it indicates an illegitimate government purpose.  Such a condition 
may show that the government seeks to restrict protected speech it could 
not limit directly, especially where a condition would not be likely to 
uncover evidence of a crime, or enhance the effectiveness of the prison 
release system.242  This could make the government’s purpose for 
promulgating a condition invalid because it would not show a connection 
between the state interest in the restriction and the crime.243  Likewise, a 
condition that relates to the crime, or includes an exception, would show 
that a restriction is constitutional because it is germane to the need for 
supervised release and not an attempt to censor speech.244  Other courts 
have found, however, that the state has a valid purpose for a condition that 
restricts access to technology and enhances public safety. 
2. But, the Government’s Intent May Be Valid Where It Offers a Condition 
To Protect the Public and Provides Exceptions To Allow Computer and 
Internet Use 
Some courts have found the government’s purpose is proper where a 
condition of supervised release is meant to protect the public and assist in a 
convict’s rehabilitation.  For example, a speech-limiting condition has been 
upheld where it related to the crime and where the government showed how 
it would enhance public safety or assist reintegration into society.245  Much 
like the reasoning in Ferber,246 those courts allowed an incidental burden 
 
 239. See, e.g., Russell, 600 F.3d at 638 (emphasizing rarity of approval of unconditional 
ban); United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 89596 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting circuit split 
on need for exceptions). 
 240. See United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 25051 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting 
impermissibility of judicial delegation of sentencing terms to probation officer); United 
States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 736 (7th Cir. 2003) (highlighting danger that Probation Office 
exception facilitates censorship). 
 241. See, e.g., United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 242. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 n.4 (2001) (arguing valid condition 
furthers interest in probation). 
 243. See supra notes 193, 23037 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra notes 192, 23037 and accompanying text. 
 245. See, e.g., United States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 155 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 
S. Ct. 300 (2009); United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 17072 (5th Cir. 2001); 173 F.3d at 
122, 12728.  See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (listing public safety among valid 
reasons for supervised release). 
 246. See supra notes 4855 and accompanying text. 
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on the First Amendment because of the damage inflicted on society by child 
pornography, and the frequency of offender recidivism.247  This danger also 
justified a lifetime term of release,248 and restricted access to adult 
pornography, where the government showed a relationship between the 
offense, the condition, and protecting children.249  Where the government 
can rationally connect the crime and punishment, it can likely show a valid 
purpose for offering a condition of supervised release. 
Courts have also found that the government’s motivation for a condition 
was proper where it provided an exception to the restriction that limited its 
scope or duration.  For example, the Third Circuit has rejected a lifetime 
term of supervised release with computer and Internet restrictions, but has 
accepted a substantially similar condition as part of a shorter term of 
release.250  The court reasoned that a condition of limited duration left open 
the possibility that a rehabilitated convict may regain speech rights.251  
Additionally, courts have found the government had a proper purpose 
where it offered an exception that allowed the Probation Office to give prior 
approval for a convict to use a computer and the Internet, even for a lifetime 
condition, reasoning that the exception showed that the government did not 
intend to restrict speech unnecessarily.252  Similar to the Probation Office 
exception, other courts have supported a condition that allowed a convict to 
view Internet content that had passed through a filter because the exception 
showed that the government’s purpose was to restrict inappropriate speech, 
rather than prevent speech.253  Including an exception to a supervised 
 
 247. See United States v. Brigham, 569 F.3d 220, 23235 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. 
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shorter duration can never be imposed as conditions of supervised release for this type of 
conduct.”). 
 251. See Thielemann, 575 F.3d at 278. 
 252. See, e.g., Russell, 600 F.3d at 63839 (surveying Parole Office exception cases); 
United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 85556 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1309 
(2010); United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 62021 (9th Cir. 2003) (collecting earlier 
cases including Probation Office exception). 
 253. See, e.g., United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 193 (2d Cir. 2004); United States 
v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 120607 
(10th Cir. 2001). 
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release condition allows the government to show that it is pursuing the 
condition in good faith to protect the public, rather than regulating protected 
speech indirectly. 
Refashioning the reasoning of courts that have upheld a limit on 
computer and Internet use in light of this Note’s framework, a condition of 
supervised release promulgated to protect the public, which includes an 
exception, may indicate valid government intent and satisfy the purpose 
prong.  The government has the authority to regulate activity that harms the 
public, and it is empowered to maintain the prison release system.254  The 
government may also add a condition to assist in the regulation of child 
pornography where it can show it possesses a germane, neutral, and non-
censorial interest in the restriction.255  Therefore, where the government 
acts pursuant to this authority, its purpose is likely proper because its 
primary intent is not regulating speech.  Additionally, the government may 
harbor multiple bona fide motives for offering supervised release with a 
technology restriction,256 and the potential for a hidden improper purpose 
may not automatically render a condition unconstitutional.257  As a result, a 
condition may be constitutional where the government, by including an 
exception to permit speech on terms it deems not harmful to the public, 
demonstrates intent beyond suppressing unpopular speech.258 
C. Prong Three:  When Is a Condition’s Effect Overly Restrictive? 
As courts have split on the propriety of the government’s motivation for 
pursuing a restrictive condition, so too have they diverged on whether a 
condition limits speech too strictly.  This section focuses on the opinions of 
courts that have discussed when a supervised release condition that limits 
computer and Internet access has the effect of too broadly restricting 
speech.  It first outlines the view that a condition may be unconstitutional 
where it indiscriminately limits access to protected speech.  Then, it molds 
the reasoning of courts that have rejected such a condition to fit the effect 
prong of this Note’s framework.  Next, it examines the opposing viewpoint 
that a condition may be constitutional where it harnesses technology to 
minimize First Amendment intrusion and protect the public.  Finally, it 
recasts the reasoning of these courts to fit the third prong of this Note’s 
framework for unconstitutional conditions. 
 
 254. See supra notes 3236, 193 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra notes 192, 24549 and accompanying text. 
 256. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 & n.9 (1982) (protecting children); 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (saving taxpayer dollars). 
 257. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 211 (2003) (plurality 
opinion) (approving condition where censorship was allegedly intended); Rust v. Sullivan, 
500 U.S. 173, 178 (1991) (upholding condition purported to limit abortion access). 
 258. See supra notes 15859, 252 and accompanying text. 
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1. A Condition’s Effect May Be Too Restrictive If It Broadly Limits Access 
to Protected Speech 
Some courts have held that the effect of a condition of supervised release 
is too restrictive where it proscribes access to protected speech, especially 
where the limitation has potentially infinite breadth.  As the Tenth Circuit 
found in United States v. White,259 a condition that restricts computer and 
Internet access, in order to limit a convict’s access to online child 
pornography, may also prevent him from obtaining a weather forecast, 
reading a newspaper, or taking advantage of the Internet’s vast wealth of 
knowledge.260  Other circuits have found the reasoning in White persuasive, 
noting that such a condition may slow a convict’s rehabilitation by vitiating 
his opportunity to engage in appropriate online speech or obtain an 
education.261  In the extreme, an inartfully worded condition could prevent 
the convict “from watching any movie on his computer that had children in 
it . . . [or using] a computer to send his own young relatives birthday 
cards.”262  Additionally, courts have rejected a condition that restrains 
access to technology because its scope may expand over time and become 
unnecessarily harsh as society increases its adoption of Internet and mobile 
computing technology.263  They have also noted that, following current 
trends, future content may only be available online and avenues for civic 
participation would be foreclosed for a convict who cannot access the 
Internet.264  Moreover, a condition that limits technology because of a child 
pornography crime may have a relatively more restrictive effect than a 
similar condition imposed for another crime.  For example, where a fraud is 
committed over the telephone or through the mail, a condition would be 
invalid where it restricted subsequent use of the telephone or postal 
 
 259. 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001); see supra notes 21517. 
 260. See White, 244 F.3d at 1206; see also United States v. Richards, No. 09-10324, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 13133, at *67 (9th Cir. June 25, 2010) (striking as invalid under the First 
Amendment a condition that limited ability to criticize a public official). 
 261. See United States v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting importance 
of access to learning); United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 737 (7th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2003); James, supra note 29 (noting online 
education for prisoners). 
 262. United States v. Riley, 576 F.3d 1046, 104849 (9th Cir. 2009) (invalidating 
condition that convict “shall not access via computer any material that relates to minors”). 
 263. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 600 F.3d 631, 636, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(disallowing condition that Russell “shall not possess or use a computer for any reason”); 
United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 2009); Freeman, 316 F.3d at 
392; White, 244 F.3d at 1206; supra notes 5762 and accompanying text (noting growth of 
Internet use). 
 264. See White, 244 F.3d at 1206; see also Quinn Bowman, Economy, Online Trends 
Threaten Newspaper Industry, PBS NEWSHOUR EXTRA, (May 8, 2009), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/arts/jan-june09/newspapers_05-08.html.  For an 
overview of economics driving news online, see Hal Varian, Newspaper Economics:  Online 
and Offline, GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 9, 2010, 9:00 AM) 
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2010/03/newspaper-economics-online-and-
offline.html. 
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service.265  Likewise, where a publication violates an obscenity law, a 
condition that limited access to printed material would also be invalid 
because of the impact on free speech;266 as courts have noted, the 
government may not limit access to online speech any more than it could 
limit access to speech in the tangible world.267  Where a condition 
indiscriminately and disproportionately prevents a convict from accessing 
protected speech, the condition’s effect may be impermissibly broad. 
An expansive condition that prevented access to a bevy of protected 
speech without concomitant benefit to public safety would most likely have 
an overbroad effect and fail the third prong of this Note’s unconstitutional 
conditions framework.  Even where the condition was circumscribed with 
narrowly tailored restrictions, the effect of a technology restriction may 
increase as the condition becomes more commonplace and more released 
convicts accept a world without Internet.268  This would reduce the 
aggregate amount of online speech and could provide dangerous precedent 
with potential to harm society’s collective ability to exercise free speech 
rights,269 minimize exposure to different opinions, and potentially remove 
controversial viewpoints from the marketplace.270  Moreover, a limit on 
computer and Internet use could drive a wedge between people excluded 
from modern technology and those who use it, which could exacerbate 
differences in living conditions over the duration of the condition.271  Such 
a restriction may also undermine opportunities to participate in a vibrant 
online community, whether dedicated to social change, shopping, or simply 
playing games.272  Where a supervised release condition broadly restricts 
access to modern technology, a court may find the condition 
unconstitutional. 
 
 265. See, e.g., United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 145 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2007); Scott, 
316 F.3d at 737; United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam).  But 
see Russell, 600 F.3d at 640 (Henderson, J., concurring) (comparing computer ban to 
revocation of driver’s license for vehicular homicide). 
 266. See, e.g., Voelker, 489 F.3d at 145; United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d 
Cir. 2002); supra notes 4347 and accompanying text (reviewing Miller and speech 
regulations). 
 267. See, e.g., Voelker, 489 F.3d at 145; Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126; Peterson, 248 F.3d at 
83; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text (noting coterminous limit on online and 
printed speech regulation). 
 268. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 269. See United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2003); supra notes 19598 
and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 15459 and accompanying text (discussing danger of speech 
suppression). 
 271. See Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2003); supra notes 19798 and 
accompanying text (highlighting constitutional castes).  An analogous, though non-invidious, 
rift occurs as a younger generation adopts new technology that an earlier generation finds 
difficult to comprehend. 
 272. See RIDEOUT ET AL., supra note 59 (categorizing online activities); Whitney, supra 
note 59 (same); supra note 63 and accompanying text (examining political engagement 
trends). 
2010] A WORLD WITHOUT INTERNET 255 
2. Nevertheless, a Condition’s Effect May Be Permissibly Restrictive If It 
Minimally Limits Speech While Enhancing Public Safety 
Even where a condition constrained a convict’s ability to avail himself of 
protected speech, courts have found the limitation justified because of the 
need to protect the public from egregious offenders.  For example, in 
United States v. Paul,273 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
explicitly rejected the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. 
White,274 which had held that a condition was invalid where it inhibited 
access to online news, weather, and research.275  Instead, the Fifth Circuit 
found that a condition may be acceptable where the convict had used the 
Internet to solicit physical contact with a minor and the condition’s 
deterrent effect justified proscribing online content; on balance the public 
benefit from reduced recidivism and enhanced safety, combined with a 
sufficient connection between the crime and punishment, outweighed First 
Amendment concerns.276  Other courts have found the reasoning in Paul 
persuasive, upholding a limit on computer and Internet access where a 
convict used those technologies to facilitate direct child exploitation.277  
Thus, infringement on First Amendment rights may be permissible where 
necessary to ensure the public is safe from sex offenders. 
Courts have also supported a supervised release condition that adopts 
exceptions to add precision and narrow the scope of its limitations.  As 
discussed earlier, including an exception that authorizes the Probation 
Office to supervise a convict’s access to the Internet shows good faith while 
mitigating the heavy-handed effect of a ban and minimizing First 
Amendment intrusions.278  Going a step further, courts have favored a 
condition that employed computer-monitoring or Internet-filtering 
technology to perforate a condition, thereby affording a convict online 
access without abetting illegal activity.279 In some cases, courts have even 
required the convict to pay the subsequent monitoring and filtering cost.280  
 
 273. 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 274. See supra notes 21517, 25960 and accompanying text. 
 275. See Paul, 274 F.3d at 16770; see also United States v. Brigham, 569 F.3d 220, 234 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009) (following Paul). 
 276. See Paul, 274 F.3d at 170; see also Brigham, 569 F.3d at 234. 
 277. See United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 62021 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 109293 (11th Cir. 2003); supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 278. See United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 7172 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(approving condition because of ban’s limited effect); supra note 252 and accompanying text 
(addressing Probation Office exception). 
 279. See United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 192 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. 
White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001) (enumerating content control using a whitelist 
or blacklist). See generally GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 93, at 5863, 65104 (2006) 
(postulating potential for Geo-ID tracking and additional opportunities for governmental 
control of the Internet and its content); LESSIG, supra note 64, at 5459, 25359 (articulating 
tracking, monitoring and filtering options respectively); JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE 
OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 10916 (2008) (detailing methods for Internet 
surveillance and monitoring). 
 280. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 178 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 409 & n.12 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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While acknowledging that filtering or monitoring may be no more effective 
or enforceable than prohibiting Internet access,281 courts have noted that 
harnessing technology may enhance a condition’s deterrent effect and 
facilitate a subsequent search of the content he accessed by enabling the 
government to view and inspect, remotely or in person, a convict’s 
computer activity.282  Technology could also be used to revise the condition 
later to ensure it remains effective and narrowly tailored.283  These 
measures may also help bridge the gap between protecting the public and 
fostering normal participation in the modern world.284  As Justice John Paul 
Stevens noted, filters may succeed at “protecting minors from sexually 
explicit Internet materials as well or better than attempting to regulate the 
vast content of the World Wide Web at its source, and at a far less 
significant cost to First Amendment values.”285  Courts favorably view 
efforts to utilize technology to narrowly tailor a condition’s effect such that 
it limits encroachment on a convict’s protected speech and prevents 
electronic excommunication. 
Recasting the reasoning of courts that have upheld a limit on computer 
and Internet use to fit this Note’s new framework, the effect prong may be 
satisfied where a condition utilizes technology to reduce First Amendment 
infringement, and enhance public safety.  A narrowly tailored condition that 
uses technology to constrain improper activity may be acceptable simply 
because it strengthens public safety and protects children from 
exploitation.286  Further, using technology to filter and monitor Internet 
content may be the most efficient method of restricting content without 
creating an unconstitutional condition,287 and strikes the optimal balance 
 
 281. See United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 
28283 (2d Cir. 2006) (suggesting special considerations for restrictions on a tech savvy 
offender).  At first blush, a convict could evade a prohibitive condition by using the Internet 
at a public library, and elude a restrictive condition if the content is unfiltered. See supra 
notes 57, 16671 and accompanying text (recognizing Internet use and optional content 
filters at public libraries). 
 282. See Miller, 594 F.3d at 18789; Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 19192 & nn.910; United 
States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003); Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126.  See 
generally ‘Monitoring’ the Sex Offender, TECH BEAT (Nat’l L. Enforcement & Corr. Tech. 
Ctr., Rockville, Md.), Winter 2005, at 1, available at 
http://www.kbsolutions.com/MonitorSexOffender.pdf (reporting on a course teaching parole 
and probation officers to manage computer use by sex offenders). 
 283. See United States v. Russell, 600 F.3d 631, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 73 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 284. See Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 179; Holm, 326 F.3d at 878; White, 244 F.3d at 1206.  See 
generally Frank E. Correll, Jr., Note, “You Fall Into Scylla in Seeking To Avoid Charybdis”:  
The Second Circuit’s Pragmatic Approach to Supervised Release for Sex Offenders, 49 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 681 (2007) (favoring filtering); Anton L. Janik, Jr., Note, Combating the 
Illicit Internet:  Decisions by the Tenth Circuit To Apply Harsher Sentences and Lessened 
Search Requirements to Child Pornographers Using Computers, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 379 
(2002) (praising consent to search); Jane Adele Regina, Comment, Access Denied:  Imposing 
Statutory Penalties on Sex Offenders Who Violate Restricted Internet Access as a Condition 
of Probation, 4 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 187 (2007) (supporting monitoring). 
 285. Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 542 U.S. 656, 674 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 286. See supra notes 4855, 200 and accompanying text. 
 287. See Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 192; supra notes 16671 and accompanying text. 
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between ensuring safety and allowing speech.288  Including an exception to 
allow for future modification of the condition can also prospectively 
prevent an unconstitutional condition from developing later.  Moreover, 
tailoring in each case could facilitate government evenhandedness that 
equalizes the ability of convicts and non-convicts to exercise freedom of 
speech without harming society.289  Finally, instituting a monitoring regime 
to search a convict’s computer would follow unconstitutional conditions 
precedent in prisoner cases, where courts have upheld a condition of release 
that required a convict to consent to a search aimed at exposing evidence of 
criminal activity.290  A condition of supervised release equipped with 
measures to minimize potential over-regulation of speech would likely have 
a restrained effect and satisfy the effect prong of this Note’s framework for 
unconstitutional conditions. 
Part II illuminated the cases where courts have ruled on a condition of 
supervised release that restricted access to technology without discussing 
unconstitutional conditions theory.  Then it recast the reasoning of those 
courts to evaluate this Note’s framework for unconstitutional conditions, 
examining in turn the arguments as they corresponded to the coercion, 
purpose, and effect prongs.  Part III takes up this Note’s framework to 
resolve the conflict in Part II, articulating when a restriction on computer 
and Internet access, as part of supervised release, is a constitutional 
condition. 
III. THE GOVERNMENT MAY OFFER SUPERVISED RELEASE, WITH A 
CONDITION THAT RESTRICTS TECHNOLOGY ACCESS, WITHOUT CREATING 
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION 
A condition of supervised release that restricts computer and Internet 
access will often pass this Note’s unconstitutional conditions framework.  
First, rejecting traditional tests for coercion and evaluating it according to 
contract principles, a condition fulfills the first prong if a convict knowingly 
and voluntarily accepts the government benefit and the corresponding rights 
burden.  Second, a condition passes the purpose prong if the restriction 
relates to the crime, and an exception to the condition shows the 
government’s intent goes beyond regulating speech.  Finally, a condition 
satisfies the effect prong by using defense as good offense; a constitutional 
condition employs filtering and monitoring technology to minimize First 
Amendment infringement and enhance the deterrent effect of a condition, 
rather than limiting technology use. 
 
 288. See Kreimer, supra note 22, at 134751.  This balance could be struck by modifying 
a convict’s Internet hardware to make it more like an information appliance than a personal 
computer. See generally ZITTRAIN, supra note 279, at 5760 (contrasting centralized control 
and what Professor Zittrain terms generative platforms). 
 289. See supra notes 19798 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra notes 133, 282 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Miller, 
594 F.3d 172, 188 n.10 (3d Cir. 2010) (declining to challenge search condition). 
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A. A Condition Fulfills the Coercion Prong, Viewed Through Contract Law, 
Where a Convict Knowingly and Voluntarily Accepts the Conditional Offer 
Taking up the first prong of this Note’s framework, the difficulty of 
discerning when a government offer of a voluntary benefit becomes 
coercive undermines the value of the analysis.  For many years, courts and 
scholars have sought to delineate when a government offer is 
unconstitutionally coercive.291  However, despite numerous efforts, there 
remains no clear test.292  For example, past attempts failed at categorizing a 
valid condition based on a right/privilege or penalty/nonsubsidy 
distinction,293 or describing an invalid condition as one that is improperly 
coercive.294  As a result, the task of demarcating when a convict 
constructively cannot reject a government offer of supervised release, 
though he is actually empowered to reject that offer, is exceedingly difficult 
and unworthy of the effort.  Moreover, incorporating a court’s subjective 
understanding of the underlying ability of a convict to reject an offer creates 
an opportunity for inconsistency, allowing a judge to identify coercion 
using Justice Potter Stewart’s famous line for spotting pornography:  “I 
know it when I see it.”295  If that takes place, case law precedent will 
become more muddled, while a definition for coercion will be no clearer, 
and judges will still lack a tool for determining when a condition is 
constitutional. 
To avoid ends-oriented analysis, and the thorny problem of defining 
coercion, it is best to evaluate the first prong of this Note’s framework 
using contract law principles.  Though contract theory cannot fully capture 
the special power imbalance that occurs when the government offers a 
convict a voluntary benefit, it does offer a cogent and doctrinally consistent 
lens for viewing the acceptance of an offer.296  Unlike issues with 
indentifying coercion, there is agreement that a contract is valid where both 
parties assent knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.297  Courts have 
consistently used contract law to analyze agreements between the 
government and a criminal, including situations where the government 
offered a more lenient punishment in exchange for a convict waiving a 
constitutional right.298  Courts have also used the concepts of knowingness, 
intelligentness, and voluntariness to separate cases where the government 
improperly forced a convict to accept an offer from cases where the 
government merely made it hard for the convict to reject the offer.299  
Similarly, courts should have no problem using these principles to evaluate 
 
 291. See supra notes 182, 18486 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra notes 182, 18486 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra notes 17980 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 295. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  It was not 
until Miller that the Supreme Court identified a clear line for obscenity. See supra notes 
4347 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 297. See, e.g., supra notes 11722, 165 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra Part I.B.2 (explicating prisoner case precedent). 
 299. See supra notes 12022 and accompanying text. 
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whether the government is coercive when it voluntarily offers supervised 
release in exchange for a convict waiving some of his right to free 
speech.300  Therefore, contract principles can be applied effectively to 
evaluate the government’s offer of supervised release and determine when a 
condition becomes unconstitutionally coercive. 
Analyzing a condition through the contract paradigm creates a 
meaningful test for resolving whether the government’s offer of supervised 
release with a technology restriction presents an unconstitutional condition.  
As a threshold matter, the government must fully apprise a convict of the 
consequences of accepting release, including the details and length of a 
condition, to mitigate the risk that a convict’s wishes will be overborne and 
decision-making process altered.301  An informed convict is thus 
empowered to reject any government benefit, no matter how valuable, once 
he can rationally weigh the options and determine his best interest.302  
While the restriction may be harsh, the vast body of contract and 
unconstitutional conditions case law protects a convict by rendering 
unenforceable any agreement that harms a third party or where assent was 
forced.303  Therefore, a condition passes the coercion prong of this Note’s 
framework where an informed convict knowingly and voluntarily accepts a 
government benefit and burden. 
Finally, courts can minimize concerns of an unduly coercive condition by 
drafting and interpreting a technology-limiting condition to comport with 
modern life.  For example, where the notion of Internet “access” once 
meant the ability to take one of the relatively few on-ramps to the 
“information superhighway,” in today’s ubiquitous Wi-Fi world, “access” 
should mean an actual connection to the Internet.  This would resolve the 
White court’s fears of a convict being restricted from entering a library, 
coffee shop, or airport, while rejecting the premise that Internet use is a 
modern convenience that may be restricted merely because it is inessential 
to life.304  Moreover, modern technology may be powerful, but many 
people are able to live without convenient access to a computer or the 
Internet, and a lifetime jail term remains distinguishable from capital 
punishment.305  A convict should be similarly entrusted to choose to live 
without such technology by exchanging access to it for increased liberty.  
However, to bolster protection against the government coercing a convict 
into accepting a condition that broadly limits technology access, the 
government must also show it does not seek to regulate speech indirectly. 
 
 300. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 18788 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 189, 222 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra notes 198, 225 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra notes 21517, 22627 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra notes 28, 5761 and accompanying text. 
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B. A Condition Satisfies the Purpose Prong Where the Government Seeks 
To Boost Public Safety and Includes Exceptions To Allow Access to 
Technology 
A condition that restricts computer and Internet access satisfies the 
purpose prong of this Note’s unconstitutional conditions framework where 
the government intends to protect the public rather than indirectly regulate 
protected speech.  There is no doubt that production, distribution, and 
possession of child pornography inflicts tremendous and lasting harm on 
children and society.306  The damage is so severe that the Supreme Court 
held the First Amendment does not protect material that depicts sexual 
conduct by minors and permitted content regulation outside the Miller 
obscenity standard.307  Especially as modern technology has made it easier 
for deviants to spread injurious content, the government deserves deference 
when it promulgates a condition of supervised release that aims to curb 
trafficking in such destructive material.308  Accordingly, courts should 
allow the government to offer a condition which it deems necessary to 
reduce recidivism by a released convict, a foundational state charge,309 and 
should presume that a condition that limits access to technology is 
constitutional where it relates to a child pornography crime that was 
committed using a computer. 
Presuming the government acts with a proper purpose squares with the 
approach taken by courts to date.  While some courts have scrutinized the 
government’s reason for a condition,310 more often courts have made 
conclusory statements approving a condition because the government said it 
sought to improve public safety.311  However, by specifically stating that it 
is deferring to the government because protecting children from online 
predators is paramount, a court can follow First Amendment precedent 
related to Internet speech.312  This also allows the court to bless the state’s 
purpose without giving short shrift to unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 
However, courts should not operate as a rubber stamp when the 
government acts with an improper purpose by seeking a condition unrelated 
to the crime.  To minimize potential coercion in these situations, the 
government should shoulder the burden to articulate some reason why a 
condition will enhance the safety of the public vis-à-vis a convict released 
from prison.313  As the Second Circuit has stated, the government will 
satisfy this burden, and demonstrate it acts with proper purpose, where it 
can make a logical connection between the condition, public safety, and the 
child pornography crime.314  Other circuits have found this approach 
 
 306. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra notes 4855 and accompanying text. 
 308. But see supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra Part I.B.2 (balancing prisoner rehabilitation, early release, and public 
safety). 
 310. See supra Part II.B. 
 311. See supra notes 6993 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra notes 4860 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra notes 23234 and accompanying text. 
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persuasive, adding the important caveat that the government will fail to 
meet its burden, even where it expresses a public safety rationale, where a 
condition restricts employment, speech, or association that bears minimal 
relationship to the crime.315  The government’s purpose will also be suspect 
where it seeks a condition because of a prior offense, or a crime committed 
without utilizing the Internet.316  In practice, this will confine the 
government to pursuing a condition where it has a valid interest in 
protecting the public or maintaining the prison release system. 
To ensure a court finds that the government’s desired condition is 
constitutional, in part because it meets the purpose prong, the government 
should show good faith by including an exception that affords a convict 
computer and Internet access in controlled situations.  Of course, a court 
could interpret a condition that restricts access to technology as an attempt 
by the government to regulate free speech indirectly.317  However, the 
government can indicate that it aims for more than indirect regulation by 
authorizing the Probation Office to permit a convict to engage in 
appropriate online speech,318 limiting the duration of the condition,319 or 
employing methods of Internet filtering or computer-monitoring to allow 
reasonable access to technology.320  This hews closely to the Second 
Circuit’s approach, which protects minors, offers a convict hope for the 
future, and expands the body of speech available to all Internet users.321    
Even if the government has a proper purpose for a condition and does not 
coerce a convict, its offer must still be evaluated under the third prong of 
this Note’s framework for unconstitutional conditions. 
C. A Condition Meets the Effect Prong Where It Protects Children While 
Using Technology To Maximize Free Speech 
A condition passes the effect prong where its impact safeguards children 
from online predators without unnecessarily restricting access to 
constitutionally protected speech.  There is little doubt that a condition that 
restricts computer and Internet use might inhibit access to legitimate 
content including online news, weather, and financial data.322  That 
condition is also apt to restrict a convict from discussing topics unrelated to 
his crime and reduce his ability to participate in a vibrant forum for modern 
speech.323  However, a criminal convict forfeits his full complement of 
constitutional rights and empowers the government to enact regulations to 
prevent recidivism.324  Given an all-or-nothing choice, courts would be 
better to continue following the Fifth Circuit’s approach, expressed in 
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United States v. Paul:  restricting the internet access of an online child 
pornography convict is a necessary consequence to guarding against 
another offense.325  This makes the condition pass the third prong because 
its primary effect provides a prophylactic against illegal activity that 
outweighs the harm of reduced First Amendment rights. 
However, the government should simultaneously adopt the Second 
Circuit’s approach to supervised release by harnessing Internet-filtering 
technology to minimize the infringing effect of a condition.326  This system 
could use whitelisting to permit access to news, weather, finance, 
education, and other valuable websites, and simultaneously blacklist 
obviously inappropriate content, such as websites that feature underage 
subjects.327  It could also take advantage of rapidly emerging technologies 
such as Geo-ID and next generation filtering methods,328 and follow the 
trend toward appliancization that is changing the online experience.329  This 
would create an intermediate zone where a convict would have the 
opportunity to participate in the electronic public square, but the 
government would simultaneously be able to prevent him from using that 
access to recidivate.330  The government could update technology as it 
develops, ensuring that the filters are revised to have the least possible 
impact on protected speech,331 and tweak the condition as the vagaries of 
the communications and technology industries play out while the convict is 
serving his prison term. 
To complement a content filter, which leaves open the possibility that a 
convict will ignore or evade a condition,332 the government should follow 
the Tenth Circuit by requiring a convict to register computer and Internet 
devices and give prior consent to electronic searches.333  This would allow 
the government to execute the search in person, or use electronic search 
technology, and vary the level of intrusiveness depending on the needs of 
law enforcement.334  Requiring consent would be consistent with the line of 
unconstitutional conditions cases which permit the government to offer 
conditions that are likely to uncover evidence of criminal activity.335  Just 
as parole offers a convict the opportunity to prove he is ready for release 
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from prison, these exceptions would allow a convict to prove he is capable 
of abstaining from cavorting in the Internet’s darkest corners.336  Instituting 
random electronic checks would also add redundancy to the system and 
facilitate filter revisions.337  While enforcement will be difficult no matter 
what method is used, affording a convict a supervised means for accessing 
the Internet is more likely to encourage appropriate use, and discourage the 
convict from viewing the unfiltered Internet at a library.338  Further, 
funneling the convict’s Internet access into places where law enforcement 
can oversee the activity provides real-time feedback to ensure the condition 
remains tailored to enhance public safety, aid rehabilitation, and ease 
reintegration—the ultimate goal of supervised release.339  This rejection of 
broad limits without exception also acknowledges the multifaceted nature 
of human beings online;340 while sex offenders who remain focused on 
destroying young lives should be monitored closely and punished severely, 
others with a divertible interest in a diversity of topics should be allowed to 
use computers and the Internet to partake in the positive change and 
previously inconceivable advances that technology has achieved throughout 
the world.  Therefore, implementing a regime of supervised release that 
builds on technology to allow a convict appropriate access to the Internet 
without risking the safety of children has a sufficiently limited effect to 
comply with the third prong of this Note’s framework for unconstitutional 
conditions. 
CONCLUSION 
Modern technology and the Internet have brought the world closer 
together by providing the means for inexpensive and instantaneous 
communication.  However, the incredible power of these tools has wrought 
serious consequences—some segments of the Internet have become havens 
for child pornographers who traffic in the exploitation and victimization of 
children.  As the number of individuals charged with producing, possessing, 
or distributing this illicit material has increased, courts and law enforcement 
have more frequently faced difficult questions about how to best protect the 
next generation of Americans without giving short shrift to the protection of 
freedom of speech enshrined in the Constitution’s First Amendment.  In 
response, many courts have coupled a harsh prison term with an offer of 
supervised release, on condition that a convict agrees to give up computer 
and Internet access while outside of prison. 
Though the many circuit courts that have addressed challenges to these 
punishments have not relied on unconstitutional conditions theory in their 
rulings, the doctrine is relevant in this situation.  Unconstitutional 
conditions theory posits that if the government is not obligated to provide a 
benefit, viz. supervised release, the government may not offer that benefit 
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on condition that the recipient must forfeit a constitutional right, viz. 
freedom of speech, in order to accept the offer.  While courts and 
commentators have failed to agree on a unified doctrine through which to 
apply the theory, this Note takes up the challenge and offers an 
organizational framework to judge the constitutionality of a condition based 
on its coerciveness, the government’s purpose, and the condition’s effect. 
When this framework is applied to an offer of supervised release with a 
condition that limits computer and Internet access, the condition passes as 
constitutional.  Viewing the coercion prong of this framework according to 
contract principles, a condition passes the test where a convict knowingly 
and voluntarily agrees to accept a term of supervised release with the 
concomitant restriction on speech.  However, because the government so 
rarely compels acceptance of supervised release, the purpose prong of this 
Note’s framework ensures the government is not offering the conditional 
benefit to regulate speech indirectly, and that a condition that restricts 
technology actually relates to the child pornography crime.  Finally, a 
condition satisfies the effect prong where the restriction protects minors and 
harnesses Internet-filtering and computer-monitoring technology to 
minimize infringement of a convict’s First Amendment rights.  Where a 
condition passes all three elements of this Note’s framework, it is a 
constitutional condition. 
 
